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Content-Based Copyright Denial
NED SNOW*
No principle of First Amendment law is more firmly established than the principle
that government may not restrict speech based on its content. It would seem to follow,
then, that Congress may not withhold copyright protection for disfavored categories
of content, such as violent video games or pornography. This Article argues
otherwise. This Article is the first to recognize a distinction in the scope of coverage
between the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause. It claims that speech
protection from government censorship does not imply speech protection from
private copying. Crucially, I argue that this distinction in the scope of coverage
between copyright and free speech law does not suggest a tension between them. To
the contrary, the distinction enables copyright to further the purpose of free speech
under the marketplace-of-ideas speech theory. Through copyright, Congress may
alleviate failures in that marketplace which stem from individuals determining the
value of speech for the collective. Furthermore, the possibility of Congress abusing
this discriminatory power poses relatively minimal threat to speech because
copyright denial does not altogether prevent speakers from realizing profit from their
speech. This fact, coupled with viewpoint-neutrality and rational-basis restraints,
alleviates the usual risks associated with government influencing content in the
marketplace. Additionally, free-speech doctrine leaves room for the sort of
discrimination that Congress would exercise in defining copyright eligibility
according to content. Doctrines governing limited-public forums and congressional
funding allow for content discrimination akin to content-based copyright denial.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has described copyright as “the engine of free expression.”1
By providing authors an economic incentive to express their ideas, copyright plays a
critical role in bringing ideas into the free-speech marketplace.2 Does this mean, then,
that as a matter of free-speech law, Congress must grant copyright to all original
content? Although courts and scholars have recognized a special relationship
between copyright and free speech, their discussion has focused on the speech
interest of copiers, whose speech copyright suppresses.3 The literature has mentioned
the speech interest of the original creator only in passing.4 In short, the question is
left unanswered: Would content restrictions on copyright eligibility abridge the
freedom of speech protected by the Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
If the Speech Clause does not preclude Congress from exercising content
discrimination through its copyright power, lawmakers likely would seek to deny
copyright for certain categories of content. Violent video games, for instance, have
come under public scrutiny in the wake of the Sandy Hook, Aurora, and Columbine
massacres.5 Lawmakers might seek to deny copyright for such games in an attempt
to reduce the financial incentive to create them.6 Another example is pornography:

1. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
(2003); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
2. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; Harper, 471 U.S. at 558.
3. See, e.g., Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (explaining First Amendment safeguards built into
copyright doctrine that protect speech interests of the copier); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–21
(same); Harper, 471 U.S. at 558 (same); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 164–65 (1998); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1, 12–29 (2001); see also C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 891 (2002); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional
Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein,
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer,
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law:
What Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform,
and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2000).
4. See supra note 3. Professor Ann Bartow recognized this issue in her argument that
Congress should deny copyright for pornography. See Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and
Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 19–25, 48 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Lou Kesten, Shooting Renews Argument over Video-Game Violence, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 19, 2012, 1:04 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/business
/articles/2012/12/19/shooting-renews-argument-over-video-game-violence.
6. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989); cf. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher
Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31, 45–47 (2011).

2015]

CONTENT-BASED COPYRIGHT DENIAL

1475

lawmakers continue to seek ways to decrease pornographic material.7 Copyright
denial could yield that result.8 Yet even if denying copyright would not decrease the
material, lawmakers might believe that government should simply refrain from
supporting pornographic content as a matter of principle. For various reasons,
lawmakers would likely seek to deny copyright for certain categories of content—if
the denial is constitutional.
This Article argues that content-based copyright denial does not offend the
Speech Clause. Importantly, this Article does not address policy considerations
related to specific content for which Congress might deny copyright. Specific
content—such as pornography or violent video games—I use as potential examples,
withholding any analysis about whether Congress should in fact deny copyright for
such content. Questions of policy specific to particular content I leave for another
work. In this Article, I limit my discussion to the constitutional question of free
speech.9 I conclude that both the doctrine and theory of free speech support a
prospective denial of copyright based on content.
Part I sets forth the initial issue of whether copyright denial would constitute a
speech abridgment given that Congress does not overtly suppress speech when it
denies a copyright monopoly. Concluding that the denial would constitute an
abridgment, the Article next examines whether constitutional doctrines suggest an
exception to the principle of content neutrality for copyright denial. In particular,
Part II argues that content-based copyright denial appears constitutional under speech
doctrines that govern the contexts of limited-public forums and congressional
spending. Part II also examines well-established copyright doctrines that, if
constitutional, further suggest the constitutionality of content-based copyright denial.
Upon examining these speech and copyright doctrines, the Article next considers
theory. Part III argues that content-based copyright denial should be evaluated from
the marketplace-of-ideas speech theory, and that that theory supports the denial.
Lastly, Part IV discusses the limits on Congress’s power to implement a
content-based copyright regime.
I. COPYRIGHT DENIAL AS A SPEECH ABRIDGMENT
This Article argues that although content-based copyright denial would constitute
an abridgment of free speech, the denial falls within a constitutional exception to the
Speech Clause.10 Before this Article examines the basis for the constitutional
exception, this Part examines the initial claim that content-based copyright denial
would amount to a speech abridgment. Simply put, would Congress’s denial of a
legal monopoly over a speaker’s expression constitute an abridgment of that

7. See Letter from Charles Grassley et al., U.S. Senators, to Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S.
Attorney Gen. (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM153_obsc.html.
8. See infra Part III.B.1.
9. Related to the constitutional issue of whether the Speech Clause prohibits this
discrimination is whether the Copyright Clause enables the discrimination. I address that
related issue in more depth in another article. See Ned Snow, Discrimination in the Copyright
Clause, 67 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
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speaker’s speech? Part I.A considers the argument that copyright denial would not
constitute an abridgment. Part I.B responds to this argument, concluding that speech
doctrine suggests that the denial would constitute an abridgment.
A. Copyright Denial as Nonrestrictive of Speech
From one perspective, the argument makes sense that denying copyright would
not constitute an abridgment of speech. Denying copyright would not leave a speaker
any worse off than before she created her expression. The denial would not restrict
her from speaking; it would merely prohibit her from having legally enforceable
rights of exclusion.11 Furthermore, denying copyright would not preclude a speaker
from selling her expression.12 Speakers who lack a copyright could still sell copies
of their expression; they just could not prevent others from copying their
expression,13 which would drive down the price of their expression.14 As a result of
copyright denial, then, speakers lacking a copyright simply could not realize the
increased revenue of monopoly pricing as compared to the revenue that they would
realize in a pure laissez-faire market for expression.15 Simply put, copyright denial
would not deny speakers a market for their expression; it would merely deny them a
monopoly advantage within the market.16 And the Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that “a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental
right does not infringe the right.”17 Hence, denying speakers a copyright would seem
to deny them only a monopoly subsidy of their right of speech. The denial would not
seem to infringe that right.
Writings of Professor Edwin Baker invoke similar reasoning.18 He argued that
failing to extend copyright to speakers does not infringe their First Amendment

11. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (listing subject matter that does not receive a
copyright); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (stating rights within a copyright).
12. See Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 332 (describing the inefficient incentives of
authors and publishers if copyright protection did not exist).
13. Speakers lacking a copyright would also lack the ability to prevent others from
making a public distribution, a public performance, and a public display of their expression,
as well as preparing a derivative work that is based on their expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 106
(stating rights within a copyright).
14. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 326, 330 (describing problems with
alternatives to copyright protection, the public good nature of expressive works, and the
relatively low marginal cost of reproducing such works).
15. See generally id. (explaining how copyright is a solution to the public good problem).
Absent copyright, there is an underproduction of the good owing to the lack of sufficient
(monopoly) revenue.
16. Even then, the strength of that monopoly advantage is debatable. See Mark A. Lemley
& Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust
and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2104–07 (2012) (explaining how doctrines of substantial
similarity, derivative works, and fair use may reduce monopoly power of copyright).
17. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
18. See Baker, supra note 3, at 901, 903.
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rights.19 In the context of explaining the relationship between free speech and the
copyright monopoly, Professor Baker stated:
Most importantly, the Speech Clause’s protection of individual liberty
guards a person’s right to engage in the activity of communicating, not a
right to profit from or receive economic return for the activity. . . .
Freedom of speech gives a person a right to say what she wants. It does
not give the person a right to charge a price for the opportunity to hear
or receive her speech.20
Professor Baker made this argument to justify an exception to copyright
protection for noncommercial copying; and admittedly, noncommercial copying by
defendants is distinct from Congress altogether denying copyright for specific
content.21 Nevertheless, his reasoning supports the general view that restricting
copyright is not an abridgment of speech. Even though he made the argument while
addressing a different issue, the underlying premise of his argument is clear:
Copyright does not represent a right secured by the First Amendment. Denying it
would not seem an abridgment.
This view also draws some support in case law. In Authors League of America v.
Oman, the Second Circuit examined the manufacturing clause of the Copyright Act,
which restricted the importation of copyrighted works based on their content.22
Specifically, the manufacturing clause restricted the importation of
foreign-manufactured works to those that did not constitute nondramatic, literary
works.23 The clause’s criterion of nondramatic, literary works thus identified a
subject matter of content for which authors’ rights were limited: for that content,
authors could not receive a copyright if they imported them into the country.24
The plaintiffs—a group of authors—argued that this restriction in the Copyright Act
abridged their First Amendment rights to circulate ideas, as well as the First
Amendment rights of the public to receive those ideas.25 Circulating ideas across
borders would deny them copyright, and that denial—the authors argued—constituted
a speech abridgment.26 The Second Circuit disagreed.27 The Oman court explained that
the First Amendment right to circulate and receive ideas does not imply a right of
copyright protection.28 In the court’s words: “Put simply, the cases plaintiffs rely upon
establish that there is a constitutional right to freely circulate one’s ideas. They also
establish the public’s right to receive those ideas. They do not, however, create any

19. Id.
20. Id; see also Nimmer, supra note 3, at 1203 (“The first amendment guarantees the right
to speak; it does not offer a governmental subsidy for the speaker . . . .”).
21. See Baker, supra note 3, at 901–04.
22. 790 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1986).
23. See id. at 221 (examining 17 U.S.C. § 601 (1985), which identifies the specific content
prohibited by the manufacturing clause as “[nondramatic] literary material that is in the
English language . . . .”).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 221–22.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 223.
28. Id.
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right to distribute and receive material that bears protection of the Copyright Act.”29
According to the Oman court, then, the First Amendment does not require Congress to
grant copyright protection to authors.30 And absent the First Amendment compelling a
copyright grant, a copyright denial would not constitute an abridgment.
In trademark law, courts have employed the same rationale in upholding
content-based restrictions. Congress has barred federal registration for any mark that
“[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter . . . .”31 On three
separate occasions, federal courts have considered whether denying trademarks
based on this content-based criteria violates the Speech Clause.32 In each case, the
court viewed the denial of trademark as not constituting speech suppression.33
Beginning in 1981, the Federal Court of Customs and Patent Appeals explained: “No
conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is suppressed.
Consequently, appellant’s First Amendment rights would not be abridged by the
refusal to register his mark.”34 Again in 1994, the Federal Circuit quoted these two
sentences to reject the same argument against the content-based criteria for federal
trademark eligibility.35 In 2003, the Federal Circuit yet again relied on this rationale,
observing that the disputed content-based criterion does not “suppress any form of
expression because it does not affect the applicant’s right to use the mark in
question.”36 Thus, in three instances courts have viewed content-based criteria for
trademark eligibility as not raising speech concerns. Each court refused to recognize
any suppression or abridgment where Congress withheld from speakers the property
right of trademark.37
Although these cases provide support for the argument that copyright denial does
not constitute an abridgment, they seem insufficient to compel this conclusion. As
an initial matter, none of the cited courts engaged in considerable speech analysis;
instead, all dismissed the speech arguments in a matter of a single sentence or two.38

29. Id.
30. See id. (“[T]he cases plaintiffs rely upon establish that there is a constitutional right
to freely circulate one’s ideas. They also establish the public’s right to receive those ideas.
They do not, however, create any right to distribute and receive material that bears protection
of the Copyright Act.”).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
32. In re Boulevard Entm’t, Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Mavety
Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1372–74 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485–
87 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
33. In re Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1343; In re Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1374; In re McGinley,
660 F.2d at 484.
34. In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484.
35. In re Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1374.
36. In re Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1343.
37. Id.; In re Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1374; In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484. The Federal
Circuit recently issued yet another opinion that upheld the three opinions that failed to
recognize any First Amendment tension. See In re Tam, No. 2014–1203, 2015 WL 1768940
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2015). However, the Federal Circuit then vacated that recent decision,
deciding to review the case en banc. See In re Tam, No. 2014–1203, 2015 WL 1883279 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 27, 2015). As of the printing of this Article, the Federal Circuit has not issued its en
banc opinion.
38. See In re Boulevard, 334 F.3d at 1343; In re Mavety, 33 F.3d at 1374; Authors League
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Furthermore, their contexts were markedly different from the issue of content-based
copyright denial. In Oman, the Second Circuit considered speech that was subject to
an author’s importation rights, which represents a fairly narrow category of speech.39
Similarly, the courts in the trademark cases were considering trademark speech,
which Congress permissibly regulates to prevent consumer confusion in commerce.40
Trademark represents a small subset of commercial speech,41 hardly analogous to the
scope of copyright, which may extend to all forms of protected speech.42 Neither the
speech in Oman nor the speech in the trademark cases reflects the broad scope of
speech that copyright contemplates.43 The conclusion, then, that denying copyright
does not amount to a speech restriction should not follow merely from a few courts
that have cursorily accepted content-based restrictions in other intellectual-property
contexts. The court opinions do not deal with the substance of the argument for
construing content-based copyright denials as speech abridgments.
B. Copyright Denial as Restrictive of Speech
As discussed in Part I.A, the argument that copyright denial does not constitute
an abridgment is simple: content creators can speak without the subsidy of a property
right, so there is no suppression of speech. This argument seems superficial because
it ignores an important practical reality of speech—money.44 Absent the money that
copyright provides to speakers, much content would simply never be spoken.45
Although the actual effect of denying copyright will depend on the particular motives

of Am. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1986); In re McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484; Stephen
R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous
and Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 686 (1993) (referring to the McGinley
court’s dismissal of the First Amendment challenge as lacking “a reasoned and well articulated
analysis of the difficult underlying issues”); Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case
and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP.
L. REV. 7, 48 (1994) (“[The McGinley] court glossed over the difficult constitutional
challenges in a cursory manner, without articulating any analysis for its decision.”).
39. See Oman, 790 F.2d at 221–22.
40. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a), 1114(1) (2012).
41. Commercial speech has traditionally received less speech protection than other protected
speech content. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 (1980). But see Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (extending
heightened speech scrutiny in rejecting regulation of commercial pharmacy records).
42. See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005) (viewing
trademarks as commercial speech for First Amendment purposes); Taubman Co. v. Webfeats,
319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The Lanham Act [which governs federal trademark law]
is constitutional because it only regulates commercial speech, which is entitled to reduced
protections under the First Amendment.”).
43. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (extending copyright protection to “original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).
44. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351 (2010) (“All speakers, including
individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic marketplace to fund their
speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting speech . . . .”).
45. See Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 332 (describing the inefficient incentives of
authors and publishers if copyright protection did not exist).
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and means of an individual author, it seems certain that in many instances the absence
of a copyright monopoly will decrease speech production and dissemination.46 Many
content creators depend on copyright to support their speech.47 Hence, removing
copyright introduces a practical likelihood of silencing speakers.
Assuming, then, that copyright denial does silence some speakers, its
discriminatory exercise would enable Congress to influence content in ways that
common sense would find offensive to fundamental canons of free speech. Even the
most egregious viewpoint discrimination would be permissible. A Republicancontrolled Congress, for instance, could deny copyright for all content from
MSNBC48—or withdraw the fair-use defense for any content criticizing the majority
view.49 Copyright would be a tool for driving specific ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace of ideas.50 It would enable naked partisanship to affect speech content.
Congress would be able to deny copyright for specific viewpoints, or for that matter,
to specific speakers. In short, if denying copyright were not viewed as an abridgment,
this would enable Congress to impose financial costs on viewpoints that otherwise
would receive core protection under the First Amendment.
Supreme Court case law on free speech supports the view that denying copyright
constitutes an abridgment of speech. The case of United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union is instructive.51 There, Congress prohibited federal employees
from accepting honoraria for making speeches or writing articles, even where those
speeches or articles would occur outside their employment.52 The Court held this
prohibition to be an unconstitutional abridgment.53 Although there was no penalty
for the speech, banning compensation for expression reduced the likelihood that
speeches or articles would be made in the first place.54 In the Court’s words, “[the]
ban chills potential speech before it happens. . . . [The] prohibition on compensation
unquestionably imposes a significant burden on expressive activity.”55 Importantly, the
Court recognized that the compensation represented a “significant incentive” to

46. See Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 925–30 (2010).
47. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (reciting within a
copyright case the quotation of Samuel Johnson: “[n]o man but a blockhead ever wrote, except
for money” (citation omitted)).
48. Cf. Zeke J. Miller, MSNBC Formally Apologizes for ‘Demeaning’ Tweet After
Republican Party Boycott, TIME (Jan. 30, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://time.com/3086/republican
-party-organizes-msnbc-boycott-over-demeaning-tweet/ (“RNC Chairman Reince Priebus sent
a letter Thursday morning to network President Phil Griffin saying he banned all RNC staff
from ‘appearing on, associating with, or booking any RNC surrogates on MSNBC,’ and in a
separate memo encouraged GOP elected officials and strategists to avoid the network as well.”).
49. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (stating the fair-use defense).
50. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991) (“[T]he government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on speech
raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from
the marketplace.”).
51. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
52. Id. at 457.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 468.
55. Id.
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produce expression.56 The Court reasoned: “By denying [Government employees] that
incentive, the honoraria ban induces them to curtail their expression if they wish to
continue working for the Government.”57 Hence, the Court viewed the Speech Clause
as extending protection to financial incentives to produce speech. Under National
Treasury, then, denying compensation for expression amounts to an abridgment.
The facts and reasoning of National Treasury seem to imply that Congress may
not deny copyright to content creators. Denying copyright could be viewed as a denial
of compensation for speech, where property rights in expression (i.e., a copyright)
would represent a form of compensation. Under National Treasury, such a denial
would be tantamount to a speech restriction.58 Like the honoraria ban, a copyright
denial would chill speech before it ever happened. Furthermore, the honoraria ban in
National Treasury was not content specific, whereas the copyright denial under
consideration here is.59 The Court in National Treasury noted the unconstitutionality
of the honoraria ban despite the fact that the ban was not content specific.60 Hence,
this distinction seems to further condemn content-based copyright denial.61
The Supreme Court further reiterated the principle that denial of an economic
incentive of speech may constitute an abridgment in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of New York State Crime Victims Board.62 Unlike in National Treasury,
the denial of the economic benefit in Simon & Schuster was based on content.63
There, New York’s Son of Sam law required that criminals’ income from their
published accounts of crimes be placed into an escrow account for the crime
victims.64 Striking down the law, the Court explained that the law served as a

56. Id. at 469.
57. Id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 468.
60. See id. (“Although [the statute] neither prohibits any speech nor discriminates among
speakers based on the content or viewpoint of their messages, its prohibition on compensation
unquestionably imposes a significant burden on expressive activity.”).
61. In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court strengthened the principle that free-speech
protections extend to economic funding of speech. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). There, Congress had
enacted a law that prohibited corporations from funding communications advocating the election
or defeat of candidates. Id. at 318–19. In striking down this law, the Court explained: “All
speakers, including individuals and the media, use money amassed from the economic
marketplace to fund their speech. The First Amendment protects the resulting speech . . . .” Id. at
351. Because money from the marketplace makes the speech possible, the economic transaction
that gives rise to the speech—that is, its funding—merits full speech protection.
This principle of protecting economic funding that gives rise to speech might be read to
suggest that the economic benefit of receiving a copyright must be protected as analogous
economic funding. Certainly the economic gain that results from copyright is the reason for
much expression that arises. Therefore, restricting property rights based on particular content
represents a restriction on an economic benefit that produces speech. Such a result seems to
violate the general principle of Citizens United—economic benefits that make speech possible
should be protected.
62. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
63. Id. at 108.
64. Id.
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“financial disincentive only on speech of a particular content.”65 As to the
inappropriateness of such a disincentive, the Court observed: “[T]he government’s
ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the
government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace.”66 Thus, discouraging ideas from entering the marketplace is
fundamentally at odds with free speech, and such discouragement may occur by
denying an economic benefit of speech. Simon & Schuster would therefore seem to
proscribe denying copyright for the purpose of creating a financial disincentive to
express content.
Of course in neither National Treasury nor Simon & Schuster did the economic
benefit originate from the government. In both cases, Congress interfered with
economic benefits that private parties would have provided speakers. Arguably, this
might distinguish these cases from copyright. Copyright is not a private-party
incentive for speech; it is a government-created incentive. It might seem that speech
doctrine would be less tolerant of content-based conditions placed on private-party
incentives to speak rather than content-based conditions placed on incentives that the
government creates with its own resources.67 Under this reasoning, may Congress
allocate its resource of copyright based on speech content?
This line of reasoning is squarely rejected by First Amendment jurisprudence.
According to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, “the government ‘may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . .
freedom of speech’ even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.”68 This doctrine the
Supreme Court set forth in Perry v. Sindermann.69 There, a state college decided not
to renew a professor’s employment contract, owing to the professor’s criticism of
school policy, which he voiced outside of his work environment.70 The Court
considered the speech implications of that employment decision, noting specifically
that the professor was not entitled to continued employment.71 Because the college’s
decision was based on the professor’s criticism, the Court emphatically recognized
that the decision constituted a content-based abridgment of speech.72 The Court
reasoned:

65. Id. at 116.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671–72 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(“[G]overnment as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as
sovereign. . . . [T]he government must be able to restrict its employees’ speech.”).
68. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (omission in original)
(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
69. 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)
(“[T]he denial of a tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the
effect of coercing the claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech. The denial is ‘frankly
aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’” (quoting Am. Commc’ns Ass’n. v. Douds, 339
U.S. 382, 402 (1950))).
70. Perry, 408 U.S. at 594–95.
71. Id. at 597–98 (“[T]he [professor]’s lack of a contractual or tenure ‘right’ to
re-employment for the 1969–1970 academic year is immaterial to his free speech claim.”).
72. Id.
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[E]ven though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government
may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest
in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a
person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations,
his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited.73
The fact that the government was targeting specific content—the professor’s
viewpoint—offended a core principle of the Speech Clause. So even though the state
was providing the employment, and even though the professor had no right to the
employment, the state could not withhold the economic benefit. In the face of such
blatant viewpoint discrimination, it makes no difference that the economic benefit
reflects a government resource or that the speaker is not otherwise entitled to the benefit.
The Supreme Court’s condemnation of content-based denials of government
benefits should not be construed as applying only where the discrimination is
viewpoint based. The Court reiterated its rejection of the content-based denial in
Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, where the content discrimination was
viewpoint neutral.74 There, a state legislature provided a sales tax exemption for
“religious, professional, trade and sports journals . . . .”75 Under the statute, then, the
tax status of magazines depended entirely on their content, yet not their viewpoints
within that category of content.76 The preferential treatment of general content
categories was, according to the Court, “particularly repugnant to First Amendment
principles.”77 The fact that the economic benefit of a tax exemption originated from
government resources, and that the speakers were not otherwise entitled to it, was
not relevant in the analysis.78 The Court simply rejected content-based preferences
in the state’s allocation of economic benefits for speakers.79
As these cases illustrate, the Supreme Court views a denial of an economic benefit
because of speech content as an abridgment of speech. The underlying rationale is
simple, as the Court has explained: “The denial of a public benefit may not be used
by the government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve
what it may not command directly.”80 So even where the government has discretion
to award a benefit, denying that benefit because of speech content is impermissible:
the government would be using the benefit to achieve an end that it otherwise could
not—speech abridgment. Thus, speech law would seem to condemn a copyright
regime that defines eligibility according to content. A black-letter application of the
speech principle that precludes content-based denials of economic benefits would
seem to preclude content-based copyright.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 597.
481 U.S. 221 (1987).
Id. at 224 (quoting Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84–1904(j) (1980 & Supp. 1985)).
Id. at 229.
Id.
See id. at 227–31.
Id. at 229–31.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 361 (1976).
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II. A DOCTRINAL EXCEPTION TO CONTENT NEUTRALITY
Having established that content-based copyright denial amounts to an abridgment
of speech, I turn to the argument that speech doctrine would recognize the denial as
a permissible exception to its general rule of content neutrality. To be sure, content
neutrality reflects a fundamental tenet of free speech.81 The Supreme Court has
articulated the principle of content neutrality as follows: “[A]s a general matter, . . .
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.”82 On several occasions, the Court has explained that
“[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”83 The fact that society deems content
undesirable does not give reason for government to discriminate against it.84 Hence,
under normal principles of free-speech jurisprudence, any exception for contentbased copyright denial cannot be based on the fact that Congress finds content
objectionable.
Absent a constitutional exception, content-based restrictions of speech are subject
to the rigorous standard of strict scrutiny; specifically, the government must
demonstrate that content-based restrictions are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.85 This means that the government must show that
an actual problem exists,86 and not merely that the public disapproves of the content
at issue.87 The problem must require curtailment of speech content,88 and the means
of curtailing the speech must represent the least restrictive means available.89 In view
of this strict-scrutiny standard, the Court has observed: “It is rare that a regulation
restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.”90
In the copyright context, this strict-scrutiny framework would seem to preclude
Congress from denying copyright for specific content. It is difficult to conceive of
an actual problem that would justify Congress denying copyright for content—a
problem that does not simply reflect societal rejection of the content itself. Although
bad consequences that follow from specific content may seem to justify content
restriction, denying copyright to authors does not seem a necessary means for
alleviating those consequences, nor does copyright denial seem the least restrictive
means for dealing with the consequences. For instance, suppose that the government

81. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995)
(“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be unconstitutional.”).
82. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (omission in original)
(quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
83. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118 (1991) (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990)).
84. Id.
85. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
86. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
87. Simon, 502 U.S. at 118.
88. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
89. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
90. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529
U.S. 803, 818 (2000)).
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could demonstrate that violent video games do in fact cause some persons to engage
in aggressive, unlawful behavior—a supposition that the Supreme Court recently
called into doubt in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association.91 It would be
difficult to demonstrate that denying copyright is necessary to alleviate this alleged
consequence of violent video games. Indeed, it is possible that by denying copyright
protection, the copying of violent video games would increase, thereby increasing
the undesirable consequence of the expression.92 Demonstrating the effect of
copyright denial—namely, that the denial would decrease content proliferation—
would be practically impossible. Moreover, even assuming that the government
could demonstrate that the denial would decrease content proliferation, such a
decrease would likely affect many video-game players who do not act aggressively.
Copyright denial would constitute an expansive means for dealing with a problem
that likely affects a fairly limited group of speech recipients. The denial would not
represent the least-restrictive means. Thus, under the heavy burden of strict scrutiny,
it seems doubtful that Congress could ever employ content as a basis for denying
copyright—especially for speech that receives full First Amendment protection.
Thus, my argument is not that content-based copyright denial would satisfy the
general strict-scrutiny test for content-based speech regulation. Instead, I argue that
existent doctrines creating exceptions to the principle of content neutrality for entire
categories of speech suggest that the circumstances warranting those exceptions are
present in the context of content-based copyright denial.93 To this end, this Part
examines both free-speech and copyright doctrines. Part II.A analyzes
well-established exceptions to content neutrality in free-speech jurisprudence to
conclude that, with proper constitutional restraints, content-based copyright denial
would not offend free speech—independent of any strict-scrutiny analysis. Part II.B
interprets copyright doctrines to reach the same conclusion.
A. Speech Doctrines
This Part argues that content-based copyright denial fits comfortably within
existent speech doctrines. Specifically, the doctrine governing content regulation in
limited-public forums94 and the doctrine governing content-based subsidies through
the spending power95 both seem applicable to content-based denials of copyright.

91. Id. at 2738–39 (“[The State] cannot show a direct causal link between violent video
games and harm to minors. . . . [The studies purporting to show a connection between exposure
to violent video games and harmful effects on children] do not prove that violent video games
cause minors to act aggressively (which would at least be a beginning).” (emphasis omitted)).
92. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 46, at 925.
93. See infra Part III.
94. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995)
(explaining that a government subsidy of speech may be a “metaphysical” limited-public forum,
and that “necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created may justify the State in reserving it . . . for the discussion of certain topics”).
95. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (“Congress
may ‘selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public
interest . . . .” (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
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After discussing these doctrines, this Part distinguishes the case law discussed above
that generally recognizes denials of economic benefits as speech abridgments.
1. Public-Forum Doctrine
The public-forum doctrine appears relevant in deciding whether Congress may
deny copyright based on content. It addresses content regulation of speech in
government-owned forums,96 where forums may represent resources that the
government has provided for private speakers.97 Although the doctrine traditionally
applies to physical forums (e.g., parks and sidewalks), the Supreme Court has also
employed it in a metaphysical sense where the government has extended a resource
as a conceptual forum for speech.98 Specifically, the Court has applied the
public-forum doctrine to analyze government funding of student organizations,99
student publications,100 a school mail system,101 and a charitable contribution
program.102 Like these resources that represent conceptual forums giving rise to
speech of private individuals, copyright represents a resource that government
provides to facilitate private speech. Copyright is analogous to a public forum.
The Court has outlined four types of forums relevant to content regulation of
speech.103 The first two are the traditional-public and designated-public forums.104
Both of these seem inapposite to copyright because both require strict scrutiny for any
content-based discrimination.105 Copyright, by contrast, has long recognized content
discriminators that are not subject to strict scrutiny.106 Specifically, the doctrines of
originality, idea-expression, fact, and useful article all define copyright eligibility based
on the content of expression, and none employ strict scrutiny.107 Hence, the
traditional-public and designated-public forums appear inapposite to copyright.
A third forum is the nonpublic forum.108 The nonpublic forum is a forum “which
is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication.”109 Copyright

96. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983).
97. See id.; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30.
98. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (recognizing university funding as “a forum more
in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense”).
99. Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 667–69 (2010).
100. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–31.
101. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46–47.
102. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 801 (1985).
103. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–47. For a concise statement on the law of public forums,
see Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1979–92 (2011).
104. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–47.
105. See id.
106. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–21 (2003) (describing idea-expression
doctrine as one of copyright’s built-in safeguards of free speech); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (applying originality and fact discriminators to determine
copyrightable content without engaging any free-speech analysis); see also infra Part II.B
(discussing existing content discriminators in copyright law).
107. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–21; Feist, 499 U.S. at 364; see also infra Part II.B.
108. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
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has existed for over two centuries to encourage public expression.110 Hence, the
nonpublic forum appears inapposite as well.
The fourth and final forum is the limited-public forum. The limited-public forum
represents a forum created “for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups, or
for the discussion of certain subjects . . . .”111 Because a limited-public forum may
exist for the discussion of certain topics, the government may preclude discussion of
other topics within the forum.112 According to the Supreme Court, limiting a forum
for the discussion of certain topics—that is, subject-matter content discrimination—
is permissible only if doing so upholds a “limited and legitimate purpose[]” for which
the forum was created.113 Stated another way, subject-matter content discrimination
in a limited-public forum is permissible if it is “reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum.”114 Viewpoint discrimination, however, is never permissible.115
The government may not restrict the limited-public forum to particular viewpoints
on a topic—only topics of discussion in support of the forum’s purpose.116
The limited-public forum seems most analogous to copyright. The forum of
copyright exists to encourage discussion of certain topics—specifically, those that
promote the progress of science.117 That is, the Constitution provides Congress power
to legislate copyright in order “[t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . .”118 There is
a clear and constitutionally defined purpose for the resource of copyright that Congress
extends to the public—promoting the progress of science.119 And because Congress

110. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (stating purpose of Copyright Act as “the
encouragement of learning”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (describing copyright as “the engine of free
expression” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985))).
111. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (citation omitted).
112. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The
necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created
may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”).
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985)).
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; infra Part II.B.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”). Notably, the purpose of copyright appears limited to the
promotion of the progress of science, not extending to the promotion of “useful Arts.” See
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“Perhaps counterintuitively for the contemporary
reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to
the progress of the useful arts.”); EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 116–18 (2002)
(linking science with copyright and useful arts with patent); Ned Snow, The Meaning of
Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. REV. 259, 273 n.53 (2013) (reciting authorities
on the issue of whether Science corresponds to the copyright power and useful Arts to the
patent power); Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science:
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (“[T]he structure of the Clause and its
history of exposition makes clear the parallel structure that associates ‘Science,’ ‘Authors,’
and ‘Writings’ with the copyright power.”).
119. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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has created this forum through its constitutional authority, its purpose is necessarily
legitimate. Straightforwardly, then, the constitutional purpose of copyright suggests a
forum created for a limited purpose, that is, a limited-public forum.
Copyright’s subsidy characteristic also suggests its categorization as a
limited-public forum. The Supreme Court recently observed that where a speech
restriction constitutes a selective subsidy rather than an outright prohibition, this fact
indicates the appropriateness of a limited-public-forum analysis.120 The Court made
this observation in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where it considered a state
school’s decision to withhold official recognition of a student organization.121 In the
Court’s words: “Application of the less restrictive limited-public-forum analysis
better accounts for the fact that [the school], through its RSO [Registered Student
Organization] program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of
prohibition.”122 Similarly, copyright does not impose any prohibition or penalty on
speech.123 Rather, copyright provides authors a subsidy in the form of property
rights,124 which suggests its classification as a limited-public forum.
Finally, the argument that copyright should be construed as a limited-public forum
draws support from the facts of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University
of Virginia.125 There, a state university had denied funding for any student
publication that manifested beliefs about deity or an ultimate reality.126 In analyzing

120. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a student organization, the Christian Legal
Society (CLS), sought to exclude students from its organization based on homosexual conduct
or religious beliefs. 561 U.S. 661, 672 (2010). Because of these exclusions, Hastings Law
School refused to give CLS official recognition as a student organization, which made CLS
ineligible for a variety of privileges (e.g., funding, facility use). Id. at 669–70. At issue, then,
was whether the Speech Clause precluded Hastings from denying the benefit of official
recognition as a student organization. Id. at 678–80. In deciding this question, the Court
applied a limited-public-forum analysis. Id.
One reason for the Court’s application of limited-public forum was that the benefit was a
subsidy rather than a prohibition. Id. at 682. In the Court’s words:
[T]his case fits comfortably within the limited-public-forum category, for CLS,
in seeking what is effectively a state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to
modify its membership policies; CLS may exclude any person for any reason if
it forgoes the benefits of official recognition. . . .
In diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished between policies that
require action and those that withhold benefits. Application of the less-restrictive
limited-public-forum analysis better accounts for the fact that Hastings, through
its [student organization] program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding
the stick of prohibition.
Id. at 682–83 (citations omitted).
Because CLS could still exist as an organization, even if it did not comply with the law
school’s condition, the pressure to comply with the condition was indirect. Id. Denying the
benefit was less severe than compelling compliance, and for that reason, the less-restrictive
analysis of limited-public forum was appropriate.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra Part I.
124. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (describing rights in copyright).
125. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
126. Id. at 822–23.
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the university’s decision to deny funding, the Supreme Court characterized the funding
as a limited-public forum.127 Important to that characterization, the Court looked to the
purpose of the university, which should inform the decision to fund student
publications. That purpose appears analogous to the purpose of copyright (to promote
the progress of science): the university exists to “encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers,” creating “a background and tradition of thought and experiment that
is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.”128 Similar in purpose,
university subsidies and copyright would seem to fall within the same sort of forum,
which according to the Rosenberger Court, is a limited-public forum.129
The conclusion that copyright represents a limited-public forum implies that
Congress may exercise viewpoint-neutral content discrimination that is reasonable
in light of copyright’s purpose of promoting the progress of science.130 Stated another
way, the content discrimination must be, first, viewpoint neutral; and second,
rationally related to advancing knowledge and learning. With respect to the
viewpoint-neutrality restraint, this is often controversial: whether discrimination is
based on the more general subject matter of content or the more specific viewpoint of
content is context specific and often debated.131 Yet that debate does not affect
Congress’s power to discriminate; rather, the debate merely defines the scope of its
discriminatory power over particular content. The copyright context would be no
different. Under the limited-public-forum doctrine, Congress could not deny copyright
to specific viewpoints, and debate would likely surround the issue of whether a criterion
for copyright denial constitutes a category of content or a viewpoint.132
With respect to the rational-relationship restraint of the limited-public-forum test,
this restraint would mirror the rational-basis test for Congress’s exercise of its
copyright power. That rational-basis test would require that Congress not deny
copyright for specific categories of content that, as a general matter, society regards
as necessarily advancing knowledge and learning.133 Congress could not, for
instance, deny copyright specifically for texts related to the hard sciences: such a
denial would be irrational in view of the purpose of copyright.134 Therefore, with the
viewpoint-neutrality and rational-basis restraints in place, denying copyright to a
category of content appears a permissible speech restriction under the doctrine
governing limited-public forums.

127. Id. at 830.
128. Id. at 834–35; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (“A
university differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even
municipal theaters. A university’s mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never
denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities.”).
129. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
130. See id. at 829–30 (describing that content discrimination in a limited-public forum is
permissible if it is “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum” (quoting Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985))).
131. See, e.g., id. at 892–95 (Souter, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority on whether
criterion represents viewpoint- or content-based discrimination).
132. See infra Part IV.A.
133. See infra Part IV.B.
134. See infra Part IV.B.
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2. Spending-Power Doctrine
Speech doctrines that govern Congress’s spending power appear relevant to
whether Congress may extend copyright based on content. When Congress funds
programs, its spending decisions may affect the content of speech.135 In response to
such content-based spending, the Supreme Court has crafted doctrines to enable the
spending while protecting core speech interests.136 These doctrines appear to inform
the permissibility of content-based copyright denial owing to similarities between
the spending and copyright powers. Both powers enable Congress to extend subsidies
to the public: the spending power enables Congress to extend monetary funds; the
copyright power enables Congress to extend property rights.137 Part II.A.2 thus
analyzes doctrine that governs content discrimination in Congress’s exercise of the
spending power.
a. Content Discrimination
Supreme Court jurisprudence allows Congress to exercise its spending power
based on the content of speech.138 In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the
Court considered federal legislation that required the National Endowment for the
Arts (NEA) to consider “standards of decency and respect” in awarding grant funds
for artistic works.139 Congress implemented this condition in an apparent attempt to
prevent pornographic works from receiving grants.140 Following the direction from
Congress, the NEA was subsequently sued by applicants who were denied funding;
they argued that the “decency and respect” condition was an unconstitutional content
restriction.141 The Court disagreed, holding that Congress’s discrimination was a
permissible exercise of the spending power.142 The Court explained: “[A]lthough the
First Amendment certainly has application in the subsidy context, we note that the
Government may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be
impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake.”143
Thus, Congress could examine content—even though the First Amendment may
have otherwise prevented such discrimination—because Congress was extending a
subsidy, rather than imposing a penalty.144
Key to the Finley holding is the fact that, as a general matter, the NEA program
requires content discrimination.145 The program requires the NEA to make judgments

135. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998)
(explaining necessity of favoring speech in funding decisions).
136. See id.
137. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (the Spending Clause), with U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8 (the Copyright Clause).
138. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587–88.
139. Id. at 572.
140. Id. at 574–75.
141. Id. at 581.
142. Id. at 587–90.
143. Id. at 587–88.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 585–86.
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regarding qualitative excellence of a work, which judgments amount to
content-based discrimination.146 And because the congressional program necessitates
content discrimination in its very function, Congress was acting as a patron of
expression, rather than as a sovereign overseeing expression.147 The Court thereby
distinguished the content discrimination in Finley from other subsidy-based acts of
discrimination: when acting in the role of patron, Congress is justified where its
funding might negatively affect artists’ speech.148 In the Court’s words: “We
recognize, as a practical matter, that artists may conform their speech to what they
believe to be the decisionmaking criteria in order to acquire funding. But when the
Government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign, the consequences of
imprecision are not constitutionally severe.”149 The nature of the program requires
Congress to act as patron of speech, and as patron, Congress steps outside its
sovereign obligation to exercise content neutrality.150
Following Finley, the Supreme Court again held that Congress could exercise its
spending power based on speech content in United States v. American Library
Association, Inc.151 There, Congress had conditioned funding for libraries on the
implementation of Internet software that would filter pornography.152 A group of
libraries argued that this condition abridged speech rights.153 Rejecting this
argument, a plurality of the Court relied on Finley to uphold the content-based
condition.154 The plurality held that public funds may be spent on a program or
purpose for which they were appropriated.155 As in Finley, the Court held that the
purpose of the congressional program guides the spending subsidy, even if that
guidance involves content-based choices.156
Finley and American Library suggest that content discrimination in copyright would be
permissible. To promote the progress of science through copyright,157 Congress must act as
patron of a certain category of speech—that which advances knowledge and learning.158

146. Id.
147. Id. at 589.
148. See id.
149. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
150. See id.
151. 539 U.S. 194, 210–11 (2003) (plurality opinion).
152. Id. at 211–12.
153. Id. at 210.
154. Id. at 205.
155. Id. at 211–12.
156. Id. This principle of permissible discrimination in extending subsidies applies equally
with respect to Congress’s taxing power. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash.,
461 U.S. 540, 548–50 (1982) (upholding legislation that denied tax-exempt status to
organizations that attempt to influence legislation).
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra note 118 (explaining correspondence between
copyright and the progress of science).
158. This is not to say that in extending copyright Congress acts as patron of particular
speech, as in Finley. The Finley Court recognized that the nature of the NEA program called
for esthetic judgments to determine excellence, which resulted in particular content being
favored over others. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998).
So in referring to Congress as patron, I do not mean to suggest that Congress patronizes
specific content, but rather I refer to its patronage of the general category of works that
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Stated in the Copyright Clause,159 this purpose of copyright suggests that Congress
may step outside its traditional role of sovereign, which is a role that would usually
bar Congress from exercising content preference.160 Accordingly, the Court’s
observation in Finley seems applicable to copyright: just as “Congress may
‘selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the
public interest,’”161 Congress may selectively copyright expression to promote the
progress of science.
Notably, although the Supreme Court has provided Congress greater
discriminatory discretion in exercising its spending power, that discretion is not
without restraint. On several occasions, including in Finley, the Court warned against
Congress providing a subsidy so as to “ai[m] at the suppression of dangerous
ideas,”162 or in other words, so as to “drive ‘certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace.’”163 In short, Congress cannot use its resources to reject or coerce a
viewpoint,164 so Congress could not deny copyright to viewpoints.

promote the progress of science.
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
160. Admittedly, I have not addressed in this Article the specific issue of whether the stated
purpose of the copyright power contemplates content discrimination. That issue I address
elsewhere. See Snow, supra note 9. Here, I observe that to the extent that the power does
contemplate content discrimination, the content-based purpose of the power is akin to the
purpose of content-based programs that Congress funds.
161. Finley, 524 U.S. at 588 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
162. Id. at 587 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
548 (1982)).
163. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
164. Id.; see also Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2321, 2330–32 (2013) (striking down a funding condition as coercively imposing a viewpoint
that required a policy opposing prostitution and sex trafficking); Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536, 544, 547–48 (2001) (holding unconstitutional a funding
condition for an organization that represented indigent clients in legal matters, where the
condition prohibited the organization from challenging the constitutionality of welfare laws);
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 366, 400–02 (1984) (holding unconstitutional
a funding condition that Congress imposed on public-broadcasting stations, where the
condition prohibited those stations from opining editorial viewpoints).
There is an exception to the usually inflexible rule against viewpoint discrimination, and it
arises in the spending context. The exception occurs when the government is speaking its own
viewpoint, or alternatively, when the government funds a private party to speak on its behalf.
The Supreme Court has explained: “[V]iewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in
instances in which the government is itself the speaker, or . . . in which the government ‘used
private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program.’” Velazquez,
531 U.S. at 541 (citation omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995)). This situation, however, does not represent copyright.
Congress is not the source of copyrighted expression; nor is Congress transmitting its own
information through copyright holders. Rather, the copyright holders are private speakers who
create the information within the copyrighted expression. So because copyright holders do not
speak on behalf of Congress, spending-power jurisprudence leaves no room for Congress to
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b. Resource Scarcity
Although the Supreme Court has afforded Congress considerable discretion to
discriminate among content in exercising its spending power, the copyright power is
arguably distinct from the spending power in one important respect. Spending
decisions require an allocation of limited resources, whereas copyright decisions do
not. Limited resources in spending decisions makes discrimination a practical
necessity. Indeed, the Finley Court cited scarcity of funding as a reason for allowing
the NEA to examine content in awarding artistic grants:165 if the spending power
were subject to a rule dictating content neutrality, Congress would need to fund either
all activities that could give rise to speech content, or none at all.166 Because the
former option is not a practical possibility, the requirement of content neutrality
would altogether erase the spending power.
Copyright, by contrast, provides the practical possibility of applying content
neutrality to all content. The infrastructure in copyright law that is necessary to
subsidize some content will—with minimal adjustment—be sufficient to subsidize
all content.167 That is to say, copyrighting all content would be just as cost efficient
as copyrighting some content. Indeed, from an administrative standpoint, it could be
more cost effective to administer property rights by introducing fewer content-based
restrictions into copyright.168 Simply put, enforcing content restrictions in copyright
seems more trouble than it’s worth. The argument, then, is that scarcity of funds
excuses content discrimination in the spending context, but it does not in the
copyright context.169
This resource-scarcity argument makes sense to a certain point. But the limited
nature of Congress’s resources represents only a secondary reason supporting

favor viewpoints in defining copyright.
165. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 585 (“The NEA has limited resources, and it must deny the
majority of the grant applications that it receives, including many that propose artistically
excellent projects. . . . [I]t would be impossible to have a highly selective grant program
without denying money to a large amount of constitutionally protected expression.” (citation
omitted)); see also Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986) (“The program is a massive
one, and requires Congress to make many distinctions among classes of beneficiaries while
making allocations from a finite fund. In that context, our review is deferential.”).
166. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (“[A]s a general
matter, . . . government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content.” (omission in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S.
564, 573 (2002))).
167. See infra note 168.
168. In this regard, former Attorney General William Rogers stated:
[E]xaminations of any more than the question whether the works involved meet
the specific statutory requirements of the [copyright] act may be regarded as not
feasible administratively. In addition, for policy reasons it may not be thought
appropriate for the Register to undertake to be a conservator of public morals.
41 U.S. Op. Att’y Gen. 395, 402 (1958).
169. But see In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 485–86 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (allowing Congress
to exercise content discrimination in the trademark context on the grounds that Congress may
make policy judgments regarding the “time, services, and . . . funds of the federal
government”).
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Congress’s constitutional ability to affect speech content through spending. Simply
put, the Supreme Court allows Congress to exercise content-based discretion in
spending because discretion is part of that power.170 Again in Finley, the Court’s
comments are instructive:
Congress may “selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities
it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding
an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way.” In doing so, “the Government has not discriminated on the basis
of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion
of the other.”171
As part of its power to pursue policies that provide for general welfare, Congress
has the inherent power to discriminate among possible policies to pursue, including
those which affect speech content.172 Congress’s ability to make discriminatory
choices in spending is not based entirely on its limited resources.173 That fact is only
one reason. Another more fundamental reason is that Congress is the constitutional
institution to judge which policies will provide for, or impinge on, public welfare.174
Congress’s power to provide for general welfare implies a power to decide policy,
even if that decision affects speech.175
In addition to the language of Finley, the holding of American Library
contravenes the resource-scarcity argument.176 As mentioned above, in American
Library a plurality of the Court held constitutional a funding condition that libraries
implement software that would filter pornography.177 The condition did nothing to
make additional content available; rather, the condition served only to block
pornographic content, some of which constituted protected speech.178 The same
content that was available through the funding condition—plus more content (the
pornography)—could have been available by not implementing the condition. In
that situation, then, Congress could not rely on the rationale that its scarcity of
funds precluded it from funding all content.179 Simply put, the scarcity-of-funding

170. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983)
(“Congressional selection of particular entities or persons for entitlement to this sort of
largesse ‘is obviously a matter of policy and discretion not open to judicial review unless in
circumstances which here we are not able to find.’” (quoting Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, 301 U.S. 308, 317 (1937)).
171. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) (citation omitted)
(quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
172. See id.
173. See id. (“So long as legislation does not infringe on other constitutionally protected
rights, Congress has wide latitude to set spending priorities.”).
174. See id. (“Congress may selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
175. See id. at 587–88.
176. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (plurality opinion).
177. See id. at 200–01, 214.
178. See id. at 200–01.
179. Id. at 237 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Since it makes no difference to the cost of Internet
access whether an adult calls up material harmful for children or the Articles of Confederation,
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argument justifies a decision to promote certain content, but it does not justify a
decision to impede certain content. Thus, the permissibility of the filtering
condition in American Library must have rested on the principle that “the
government has broad discretion to make content-based judgments in deciding
what private speech to make available to the public.”180 The discretion inherent in
Congress’s power to expend resources—not resource scarcity— justified American
Library. In sum, the fact that resources are scarce in the spending context seems
unpersuasive as an argument that the copyright power does not afford Congress
content-based discretion.
c. Vagueness
Spending power jurisprudence addresses a concern with Congress denying
copyright to a category of content. In specifying general categories of content that
are ineligible for copyright, Congress might enable judges to impose their own
subjective views of content.181 For instance, if Congress were to create a
copyright-eligibility requirement that barred copyright protection for pornography,
judges might apply this requirement to deny protection for artistic works with nude
models. Under free-speech jurisprudence, statutes that set forth criteria that provide
excessive discretion in their enforcement may be challenged as unconstitutionally
vague.182 More specifically, the vagueness doctrine examines whether a statute
“impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary
and discriminatory application.”183 On this basis, it might seem that a criterion
requiring judges to decide whether content is “pornographic” or “graphically violent”
introduces unconstitutional vagueness.
Under the rationale of spending-power cases, this argument would not likely
succeed. The Supreme Court in Finley addressed a similar argument; namely, that
the criteria for funding—“decency and respect”—was unconstitutionally vague.184
The Court rejected this argument, explaining:
The terms of the provision are undeniably opaque, and if they appeared
in a criminal statute or regulatory scheme, they could raise substantial
vagueness concerns. . . .
In the context of selective subsidies, it is not always feasible for
Congress to legislate with clarity. Indeed, if this statute is
unconstitutionally vague, then so too are all Government programs

blocking (on facts like these) is not necessitated by scarcity of either money or space.”
(footnote omitted)).
180. Id. at 204 (plurality opinion).
181. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,108–09 (1972) (“A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application.” (footnote omitted)).
182. See id.
183. Id.
184. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 583–89 (1998).
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awarding scholarships and grants on the basis of subjective criteria such
as “excellence.”185
This explanation suggests that the Court rarely, if ever, applies the vagueness
doctrine to statutes that award subsidies. Furthermore, courts do not usually apply
the vagueness doctrine to find a civil law unconstitutional.186 The vagueness doctrine,
then, would not likely preclude Congress from designating imprecise content
discriminators as a basis for denying copyright. Copyright’s context of selective
subsidies excuses the imprecision involved with applying content-based criteria to
entertainment.
In a brief departure from free-speech jurisprudence directly addressing vagueness,
I here call attention to the fact that the Supreme Court has addressed an issue related
to vagueness in the specific context of applying a content-based criterion for
copyright eligibility.187 This occurred in the 1903 case of Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.,188 which I discuss at great length in another article that addresses
more fully the issue of whether the Copyright Clause gives power to exercise content
discrimination.189 Here, I mention only that Bleistein teaches that Congress may not
designate a content-based criterion so general—such as designating that a
copyrightable work must be “fine” or “attractive”—that it would effectively delegate
Congress’s discriminatory authority to the judiciary.190 This teaching is consistent
with the modern vagueness and nondelegation doctrines as applied to selective
subsidies.191 Only extremely deferential content-based criteria would be held
unconstitutionally vague.
3. Distinctions from Other Economic-Benefit Denials
Although the speech doctrines discussed in Part II.A.1 and Part II.A.2 above
suggest the constitutionality of content-based copyright denial, those doctrines do
not specifically address case law regarding denials of economic benefits. Recall that
Supreme Court case law recognizes denials of economic benefits as speech
abridgments.192 At first glance, and as discussed above, this case law seems damning
for content-based copyright.193 But these cases are distinct from the copyright context
in one critical respect: where economic-benefit denials have constituted a speech

185. Id. at 588–89.
186. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99
(1982) (“The [Supreme] Court has also expressed greater tolerance of [vague] enactments with
civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively
less severe.”).
187. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250–52 (1903).
188. Id.
189. See Snow, supra note 9.
190. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250–52.
191. Cf. Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589 (1998); Touby v.
United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (“Congress may not constitutionally delegate its
legislative power to another branch of Government.”).
192. See supra Part I.B.
193. See supra Part I.B.
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abridgment, the speakers could not both realize the economic benefit and speak the
content at issue. Specifically, the economic-benefit denials consisted of denying any
possibility of profits,194 denying employment opportunities,195 and denying tax
benefits.196 In none of these situations could the speakers realize the benefit if they
spoke the content, so the denial was unconstitutionally coercive. By contrast, denying
copyright does not preclude speakers from both speaking the content and receiving
the economic benefit of profiting from their speech. The absence of copyright does
not imply the absence of the opportunity to profit.197 It implies only the absence of a
government-backed legal monopoly.198 Copyright denial is therefore distinct from
the economic-abridgment case law on the grounds that in the copyright context,
government precludes speakers from employing only one means for realizing the
economic benefit, rather than precluding speakers from employing any means for
realizing that benefit. As a result, copyright appears much less coercive than other
economic-denial contexts where the Court has recognized a speech abridgment.
The other contexts where the Court recognized economic denials as abridgments
are also distinguishable from copyright in that they lacked speech-centric safeguards
to prevent congressional abuse of content-based discretion. Specifically, the other
contexts lacked any restraints relating to viewpoint neutrality or rational basis. In
contrast to those other contexts, Supreme Court jurisprudence has permitted content
discrimination where government extends economic benefits with rational-basis and
viewpoint-neutrality restraints in place—that is, the contexts of limited-public
forums and congressional funding for programs.199 Hence, the constitutional
restraints on content-based copyright denials suggest their similarity with the
contexts where the Court has allowed Congress to discriminate in extending
economic benefits, as opposed to those contexts where the Court has not.
B. Copyright Doctrines
This Part considers copyright doctrine to inform the doctrinal question of whether
content-based copyright violates the Speech Clause. Part II.B.1 observes established
copyright doctrines that deny copyright protection to categories of content which
receive full First Amendment protection. Part II.B.2 argues that Congress’s actions
under the fair-use doctrine strongly suggest that Congress may exercise
content-based discrimination in defining copyright eligibility. Part II.B.3 examines
case law that addresses the relationship between copyright and free speech, Golan v.
Holder200 and Eldred v. Ashcroft.201

194. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995); Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991).
195. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1972).
196. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 222 (1987).
197. See supra Part I.A.
198. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 332 (describing the inefficient
incentives of authors and publishers if copyright protection did not exist).
199. See supra Part II.A.1–2.
200. 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–93 (2012).
201. 537 U.S. 186, 192–94 (2003).
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1. A History of Content-Based Copyright Denial
A history of Congress engaging in a particular act may serve as evidence that the
act is constitutional.202 With this principle in mind, I here observe different copyright
doctrines though which Congress has denied copyright to categories of content that
receive First Amendment protection. That history suggests that Congress could deny
copyright for other categories of content that represent protected speech.
Consider the originality doctrine. It bars copyright protection for content that is
not sufficiently creative.203 But a lack of creativity is not reason to deny First
Amendment protection.204 Consider that truths and facts represent a category of
content that is not copyrightable.205 Yet factual and truthful content lies at the core
of protected speech.206 Consider the idea-expression dichotomy. That doctrine limits
copyright to the expression of ideas, not inclusive of the ideas themselves—an
ostensible content-based restriction.207 Those same ideas, however, receive strong
protection under the First Amendment.208 Finally, consider the useful-article
doctrine. It denies copyright for content consisting of an object whose aesthetic
design cannot be distinguished from its utilitarian function.209 Nevertheless, such a
distinction between expression and functionality does not bar the object’s protection
as speech.210 Thus, existent doctrines in the Copyright Act establish a history of
content discrimination without free-speech offense. They suggest that the fact that
content receives protection from government abridgment does not imply that content
must receive protection from private copying.
The history of Congress in trademark and patent law lends further support to the
conclusion that free-speech doctrine does not preclude Congress from exercising
content discrimination in denying copyright. Like the copyright power, Congress’s
patent power enables Congress to incentivize expression that discloses inventions.211

202. See id. at 200–01 (reciting the long history of Congress granting authors term
extensions on existing works as evidence of constitutionality of act).
203. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991).
204. See Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that telephone directories receive full First Amendment protection).
205. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any idea . . . .”); Feist, 499 U.S. at 347–48 (“Section 102(b) of [the
Copyright Act] is universally understood to prohibit any copyright in facts.”); Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99, 100–01 (1879) (“Where the truths of a science or the methods of an art are the
common property of the whole world, any author has the right to express the one, or explain
and use the other, in his own way.”).
206. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (explaining that the
function of the marketplace of ideas is to seek truth).
207. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50.
208. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (barring government from acting to “drive certain ideas or viewpoints
from the marketplace”).
209. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
210. See, e.g., Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2006)
(examining whether a utilitarian object has expressive purpose for speech protection).
211. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
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Under that power, Congress has legislated to discourage the expression of certain
content by denying patent protection for inventions directed toward human
organisms212 and for inventions relating to nuclear energy or atomic bombs.213 Under
trademark law, Congress incentivizes expression that will reduce consumer
confusion as to the source of goods or services.214 To that end, since 1905 Congress
has denied federal registration for any trademark that consists of immoral or
scandalous matter.215 This history suggests a simple conclusion: that the Speech
Clause does not preclude Congress from denying an intellectual-property right based
on content.
2. Content-Based Discretion in Fair Use
Another instance of Congress exercising content discrimination in copyright law
arises in the fair-use doctrine. Congress has defined specific categories of content
that are more likely to qualify as fair uses of original expression.216 Stated another
way, Congress has defined categories of content that copiers should be able to repeat
without punishment.217 Those categories include content related to news, criticism,
and education.218 Importantly, this content discrimination in fair use is relevant to
free speech because copying expression may represent speech.219 Through copying
another’s expression, a copier may attempt to communicate her own ideas by using
the original expression.220 Copiers may engage in second-speaker speech. This fact
has led the Supreme Court to recognize fair use as a “First Amendment
accommodation[],” so that copyright does not suppress second-speaker speech.221 So
because copying in some instances constitutes second-speaker speech, Congress’s
specification of fair-use categories (for example, news, criticism, and education)
represents content-based discrimination of second-speaker speech.222 By defining

the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012)
(requiring a written description of invention to receive a patent).
212. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 634, 118 Stat. 3, 101.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2012).
214. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (imposing liability for consumer confusion
in trademark law).
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012) (barring federal registration for any mark that
“[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter”); Act of Feb. 20, 1905,
Pub. L. No. 59-84, ch. 592, § 5(a), 33 Stat. 724, 725 (barring federal registration for a mark
that “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral or scandalous matter”). Trademark arises under
Congress’s commerce power. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879).
216. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (listing that the following fair-use purposes are not an infringement
of copyright: “purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research . . . .”).
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. See supra note 3.
220. See supra note 3.
221. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
222. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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which sort of content receives fair-use protection, Congress has defined which sort
of content should receive speech protection.223
Significantly, Congress’s content-based definition of fair use is not without
practical consequence, for the remedies of copyright infringement may involve
severe criminal and financial penalties.224 Copiers who engage in second-speaker
speech (against whom Congress has discriminated in defining content-based
categories of fair use) face criminal and financial penalties for speaking.225 By
contrast, speakers of original expression (against whom Congress might discriminate
in defining copyright eligibility) would face the absence of a government-backed
monopoly for speaking. So if Congress abuses its content-based discretion in
defining fair use, legitimate speakers of second-speaker speech (that is, fair uses for
which Congress has denied fair use) would face jail time226 and punitive damages;227
by contrast, if Congress were to abuse its content-based discretion in defining
copyright eligibility, speakers of original expression would face only an absence of
a legal monopoly. The penalties, then, for second-speaker speech are much harsher
than those for original expression. And this matters because insofar as free-speech
doctrine allows for content-based discretion in deciding fair-use speech suppression
(where the effects of congressional abuse would severely curtail speech given the
harsh penalties for such second-speaker speech), it would seem to follow that
free-speech doctrine would also allow for content-based discretion in deciding
copyright-eligibility suppression (where the effects of abuse are relatively mild given
the absence of penalties for such original expression). If Congress may discriminate
in defining the fair-use doctrine, it would seem that Congress may also discriminate
in denying copyright to original speakers.
Congress’s treatment of fair use further illustrates the discretion that Congress
may exercise in setting boundaries for speech-protective doctrines in copyright.
Consider the interplay of fair use with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA).228 The DMCA punishes individuals who circumvent encryption
technology to gain access to copyrighted material.229 By punishing
anti-circumvention technologies, Congress has precluded second-speech speakers
from making fair uses of copyrighted material.230 That is to say, Congress has denied

223. See id.
224. See id. § 504 (stating civil remedies for copyright infringement, including statutory
damages); id. § 506 (stating criminal remedies for copyright infringement).
225. See id. § 504; id. § 506.
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012).
227. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
228. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
229. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2012) (“No person shall circumvent a technological measure
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”).
230. See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 420–29 (1999) (arguing that the
anticircumvention provision of the DMCA unconstitutionally restricts speech); Jacqueline D.
Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s
Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 124–36 (2005) (reciting criticisms against
DMCA’s fair use protection).
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speech of fair users for the purpose of furthering an anti-infringement policy. Is this
denial of fair use permissible, given that fair use represents a “First Amendment
accommodation[]” of copyright law?231 Courts have answered yes, opining that the
DMCA’s effect on fair use lies within Congress’s constitutional discretion.232
Thus, Congress’s preference for certain content as fair use, as well as Congress’s
disregard for fair use in enacting the DMCA, suggests that Congress has
constitutional discretion to define the boundaries of copyright law in a way that may
affect protected speech interests. Content-based copyright seems to fit within that
discretion. Defining copyright eligibility according to content appears consistent
with Congress’s treatment of speech interests in the fair-use context.
3. Statements of the Modern Court
The Supreme Court has never considered the question of whether a content-based
denial of copyright offends the Speech Clause. But the Court has made a few
statements that could be interpreted as suggesting a position on this question in the
cases of Eldred v. Ashcroft233 and Golan v. Holder.234 In Eldred, the Court considered
Congress’s extension of the copyright term for an additional twenty years, and the
extension as applied to works that authors had already created (under a shorter
term).235 In Golan, the Court considered Congress’s similar act of recopyrighting
works whose term had already expired.236 In both cases, petitioners challenged
Congress’s acts on First Amendment grounds: the actions of Congress unjustifiably
suppressed second-speaker speech.237 The Court dismissed those challenges on the
basis that the purpose of copyright—to incent free speech—justified Congress’s
expanding the monopoly protection.238 The Court further observed that copyright was

231. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
232. See Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1198 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (“The possibility that § 1201 [of the DMCA] might prohibit some otherwise
noninfringing public uses of copyrighted material arises simply because the Congressional
decision to create liability . . . . ” (citations omitted)); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
The Reimerdes court’s comments are instructive on this issue:
[Fair use] has been viewed by courts as a safety valve that accommodates the
exclusive rights conferred by copyright with the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment.
....
. . . If Congress had meant the fair use defense to apply to such [DMCA]
actions, it would have said so. Indeed, as the legislative history demonstrates, the
decision not to make fair use a defense to a claim under [the anticircumvention
provision of the DMCA] was quite deliberate.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
233. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
234. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
235. 537 U.S. at 192–93.
236. 132 S. Ct. at 878.
237. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218.
238. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–19. The Eldred Court stated:
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insulated from free-speech objections because copyright has doctrines that safeguard
free-speech interests—namely, fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy.239 In short,
the Court in Eldred, and again in Golan, concluded that copyright’s speech-centered
purpose and its speech-centered safeguards excuse copyright from the usual sort of
speech review that the Court applies in other contexts.240
These comments might suggest that the Court would not read the Speech Clause
as restricting Congress from exercising content discrimination in copyright. The
Court made clear that it does not subject copyright to the normal speech-protective
doctrines of the First Amendment;241 so under that reasoning, doctrines precluding
content discrimination might not apply in copyright. Stated another way, the Court
gave Congress a pass against free-speech scrutiny in Eldred (and again in Golan),242
so arguably the Court would give Congress the same pass were it to employ
content-based criteria to determine copyright eligibility.
On the other hand, the Court’s comments might suggest the opposite conclusion.
As an initial matter, the Court’s comments that purport to diminish the importance
of First Amendment considerations in copyright law were made in the context of
analyzing speech interests of copiers—not creators. Specifically, the Court examined
only the speech interests of the second-speaker copier, as evidenced by its brief
observation that the First Amendment “bears less heavily when speakers assert the
right to make other people’s speeches.”243 Similarly, with respect to the
speech-protective doctrines that the Court cited as alleviating free-speech concerns
(fair use and idea-expression dichotomy), those doctrines alleviate free-speech
concerns only with regard to speech interests of copiers—not creators. Therefore, the
leniency with which the Court applied free-speech doctrines to copyright might be
read as applying only to the speech interests of copiers.
Eldred and Golan may be further read to suggest against content discrimination
in defining copyright eligibility. The Court in both cases described copyright as “the
engine of free expression.”244 This statement could be interpreted to mean that the
Court views the copyright system as important as the very doctrines of free speech:
both copyright and free speech exist to increase speech production. So if both
doctrines are equivalent in function, it would seem that content-based restraints on

We reject petitioners’ plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a
copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and
safeguards. The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in
time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited
monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed, copyright’s
purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free expression.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–19 (emphasis in original).
239. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20.
240. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889–91; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–21.
241. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–19 (“We reject petitioners’ plea for imposition of
uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective
purposes and safeguards. . . . In addition to spurring the creation and publication of new
expression, copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations.”).
242. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889–91; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218–21.
243. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
244. Id. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985)); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred).
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copyright’s incentive function would be equivalent to content-based restraints on
free-speech doctrine.245 Hence, the Court’s emphasis on the importance of copyright
in facilitating free speech could suggest that the Court would apply free-speech
principles to protect the speech interests of first-speaker creators in the copyright
context. If that were the case, content-based copyright denial would be no different
from content-based speech abridgment.246
Ultimately, the Court’s comments do not definitively decide the issue. Although
the Court suggested that the First Amendment bears less heavily in copyright, those
comments were relevant only for the speech interest of the copier.247 And the Court
made its First Amendment pronouncements in the context of evaluating legislation
that extended copyright protection, which furthers the speech interest of content
creators, as distinct from legislation that denies copyright to content, which
diminishes the speech interest of content creators. Moreover, although the Court
described copyright as “the engine of free expression,”248 that mere description
seems insufficient to determine a weighty doctrinal speech issue. To be sure, the
Court’s comments were made in contemplation of an issue distinct from the one
under consideration in this Article. Hence, although comments of the Court could be
construed to support either position, they are not definitive by any means.
III. THEORETICAL SUPPORT FOR THE EXCEPTION
Although Part III describes how speech and copyright doctrines may be
interpreted to suggest that content-based copyright denial does not offend the Speech
Clause, this fact does not imply the same conclusion under speech theory. This Part
therefore examines whether free-speech theory allows for, and indeed supports,
Congress designating particular categories of content as ineligible for the monopoly
subsidy of copyright. In short, does free-speech theory support content-based
copyright denial?

245. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 37 (interpreting the Court’s “engine of free expression”
characterization of copyright as meaning that the Court recognized “First Amendment interests
on both sides of a copyright case”).
246. In both Eldred v. Ashcroft and Golan v. Holder, the Court referred to the congressional
acts under consideration as content-neutral copyright legislation. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 884
(reciting the district court’s premise that “[URAA] does not regulate speech on the basis of its
content”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218 (referring to the petitioner’s argument “that the CTEA is a
content-neutral regulation of speech”). That the Court made this reference to content neutrality
could suggest that a content- or viewpoint-discriminatory Copyright Act would be subject to
strict scrutiny, and thereby unconstitutional. This interpretation, however, gives too much
weight to comments that referenced how others (the petitioners in Eldred and the district court
in Golan) characterized the acts under consideration.
247. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
248. Id. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985)); Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred).
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A. A Choice Between Speech Theories
The answer to the question above depends on which free-speech theory is under
consideration.249 Speech theories may be grouped into two general categories: those
based on the utility that speech provides individual speakers and those based on the
collective good that speech provides collective society.250 The former group I refer
to as individual-utility speech theory. That theory recognizes speech protection
because of speech’s inherent value to individual speakers: specifically, speech
allows individuals to realize self-fulfillment, to exercise autonomy, to participate
in cultural experience and democratic governance, and to achieve human dignity
and self-gratification.251 Under individual-utility theory, then, speech is protected
for its own sake.252
By contrast, collective-good theory of free speech posits that speech rights exist
to facilitate an end that is desirable from the collective perspective of society.253 The
collective-good theory that is most recognized in jurisprudence and scholarship is
the marketplace-of-ideas theory.254 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who penned this

249. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2:3 (2014)
(recognizing three classic theories of free speech: “marketplace of ideas”; “human dignity and
self-fulfillment”; and “democratic self-governance”).
250. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at
785–86 (2d ed. 1988) (questioning whether the purpose of free speech is to further a collective
end or to realize an end in itself).
251. See SMOLLA, supra note 249, § 2:21; C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) (“Speech is protected not as a means
to a collective good but because of the value of speech conduct to the individual. The liberty
theory justifies protection because of the way the protected conduct fosters individual
self-realization and self-determination without improperly interfering with the legitimate
claims of others.”); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593
(1982) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one true value,
which I have labeled ‘individual self-realization.’”).
252. See SMOLLA, supra note 249, § 2:21.
253. See id.
254. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 16
(1982) (recognizing the influence of the marketplace-of-ideas theory); SMOLLA, supra note
249, § 2:4 (“The marketplace theory is perhaps the most famous and rhetorically resonant of
all free speech theories, though it has often been attacked by modern scholars. It remains,
nevertheless, a central driving force in contemporary free speech thinking.”). Another
collective-good theory is the theory of self-governance. This theory draws primary support
from Alexander Meiklejohn and Robert Bork, who argued that the primary purpose of free
speech is its importance to democracy: free speech enables the democratic process of debating
policy and electing officials. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26 (1948); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26–28 (1971); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First
Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255–57. As argued by these scholars, the
self-governance theory represents a collective-good theory of free speech. See SMOLLA, supra
note 249, §§ 2:6, 2:21 (commenting that self-governance theory benefits the collective). Yet
this theory has also been interpreted as serving self-realization values. See Redish, supra note
251, at 601–11 (interpreting self-governance theory of free speech as benefiting the
individual). It therefore may be categorized as either a collective-good theory or an
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theory into American jurisprudence, explained that the right of free speech rests on
the premise “that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.”255 Thus, under the marketplace-of-ideas theory, free
speech exists to enable the best forum for producing truth.256 Free speech, in other
words, exists to yield a collective good.
At first glance, the prospect of content-based copyright denial seems in conflict
with both speech theories. Under individual-utility theory, content-based copyright
denial lacks justification. Suppose, for instance, that both the creator and the recipient
of pornography realize self-fulfillment from generating and receiving that content. If
Congress were to deny copyright for pornographic works, this would likely decrease
profit opportunities for the pornography creator, which might preclude him the
financial means to reach his audiences, and for that matter, the financial means to
support his desire to engage in that speech. Neither the pornography creator nor his
audience would realize their individual self-fulfillment. Likewise, marketplace
theory seems inconsistent with content-based copyright denial. Such denials would
represent Congress interfering with the laissez-faire forces of the marketplace of
ideas. Congressional favoring of content would seem to interrupt the best test for
truth—“the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market.”257 Thus, content-based copyright denial does not seem to fare well under
either speech theory.
This conclusion is premature, however. As discussed in Part III.B, content-based
copyright denial may actually correct problems in the marketplace of ideas that
would otherwise impede the marketplace from realizing its purpose. That discussion,
however, is appropriate only if copyright should be evaluated from the
marketplace-of-ideas perspective, rather than individual utility. The remainder of
Part III.A therefore considers which speech theory is most appropriate for evaluating
copyright doctrine. Although this question merits much more discussion, I offer a
few brief observations in the sections below that suggest copyright makes sense only
through the free-speech theory of marketplace of ideas.

individual-utility theory, depending on its interpretation.
255. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
SMOLLA, supra note 249, at § 2:16.
256. It may be that the ultimate good is not truth, but rather “the best test of truth.” See
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Holmes appears skeptical
that truth can actually be known, and so he seeks “the best test for truth.” See id. (emphasis
added); SCHAUER, supra note 254, at 20 (characterizing Holmes’s marketplace-of-ideas
depiction as skeptical of the ability to know objective truth). That is to say, Holmes may value
the process of finding truth over a standard of truth. Yet as Professor Frederick Schauer
observes, a theory of majority rule for truth distorts the meanings of true, good, sound, or wise.
See id. at 22. Professor Schauer states: “If free speech is justified because it defines the process
that produces knowledge, and if that knowledge is in turn defined by the very same process,
we are saying nothing at all.” Id. Marketplace of ideas as a theory of truth, then, seems focused
on truth as the end of free speech, not merely the process of having a diversity of viewpoints
with majority preference ruling. See id. For purposes of this Article, however, this distinction
is not essential. I rely only on the premise that the marketplace theory seeks an end of free
speech that reflects a collective, rather than individual, benefit for society.
257. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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1. The Argument for Marketplace Theory
The very function of copyright suggests that a collective-good theory of free
speech—rather than a theory based on a speaker’s individual utility—must be the
theory that sets boundaries on the copyright power. Copyright suppresses copiers
from speaking another’s expression.258 That is, copyright suppresses speech.259
Consider the student who plagiarizes a paper, the musician who publicly performs a
composer’s notes, or the critical reviewer who quotes from a book: each represents
a copier who is attempting to communicate ideas through expression, albeit repeated
expression. Such copiers constitute second speakers of content that derives from first
speakers.260 Copyright, then, suppresses the repeated speech of second speakers in
order to incentivize original speech of first speakers. As discussed below, that basic
function of copyright implies that the copyright system can be justified under only
the marketplace-of-ideas theory—not individual-utility theory.
The marketplace theory of free speech provides a compelling justification for
suppressing expression of the second speaker. In the first place, the marketplace
theory is most concerned with speech entering and spreading through the
marketplace.261 This ideal of the marketplace justifies second-speaker speech
suppression: that suppression is necessary to incentivize speakers to create and
disseminate original ideas. The Supreme Court alluded to this point while explaining
the relationship between the freedom of speech and copyright’s suppression of
second-speaker speech.262 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, and in Golan v. Holder,263 the Court
responded to First Amendment challenges to Congress retroactively altering the
copyright term.264 In denying that challenge in Eldred, the Court explained: “The
First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make—or decline to make—one’s
own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other
people’s speeches.”265 Thus, the Court observed that free speech concerns are less
important in evaluating copyright’s suppression of second speakers. The Court was
more concerned with first speakers, ostensibly because they enable content to enter

258.
Copyright law restricts speech: it restricts you from writing, painting, publicly
performing, or otherwise communicating what you please. If your speech
copies ours, and if the copying uses our “expression,” not merely our ideas or
facts that we have uncovered, the speech can be enjoined and punished, civilly
and sometimes criminally.
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 3, at 165–66.
259. See id.; Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent
Judgment Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2433–34, 2466–70 (1998) (relying
on the premise that copied expression is speech requiring procedural protections).
260. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing copyright’s suppression of second-speaker speech).
261. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); SMOLLA, supra note 249, § 2:19
(“The marketplace theory is thus best understood not as a guarantor of the final conquest of
truth, but rather as a defense of the process of an open marketplace.” (emphasis in original)).
262. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–91 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186, 218–21 (2003).
263. See supra Part II.B.3 for a summary of these cases.
264. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 878; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218.
265. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
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the marketplace of ideas. Again in Eldred and Golan, the Court articulated this
reasoning to justify copyright’s suppression of second-speaker speech: “[The
Framers] also saw copyright as an ‘engine of free expression[:] By establishing a
marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.’”266 In these comments, the Court justified
copyright’s suppression of copied speech through a speech theory that values both
the creation and the dissemination of ideas, strongly suggesting the marketplace of
ideas. In short, copyright’s very function of suppressing second speakers to enable
first-speaker speech indicates a speech theory that places a priority on facilitating the
creation and dissemination of new ideas—namely, the marketplace-of-ideas theory.
This is not to say, however, that second-speaker expression has no value in the
marketplace of ideas. Indeed, second speakers further disseminate ideas for public
evaluation, and in this way, the copyright monopoly might retard public knowledge.
Yet the benefit of incenting and disseminating new ideas outweighs the limited
suppression of second-speaker dissemination—under the values that control
marketplace theory. Marketplace theory recognizes that the collective benefit—more
ideas entering the marketplace—is greater than the collective cost—limited
suppression of free dissemination.267 Therefore, only because of copyright’s potential
to increase the supply of ideas does the marketplace theory value suppression of
second-speaker speech.
But of course there are exceptions. It is possible that the marketplace of ideas
would recognize more value in some instances of second-speaker speech as
compared to the strength of the first-speaker monopoly. Consider, for instance, a
newspaper that quotes a damning confession from a private memoir of a political
candidate.268 Marketplace theory would value the speech interest of the
second-speaker newspaper in disseminating the expression over the monopoly
interest of the original author, who seeks to employ copyright to keep his expression
private rather than as a financial tool to achieve greater dissemination. Consider a
critical parody that copies a work to criticize the original message.269 In that
particular instance, marketplace theory would value the second speaker’s attempt to
express a new idea of criticism more so than it would value the first speaker’s
monopoly, especially where the first speaker attempts to employ copyright as a

266. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219); see also Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“By establishing a marketable
right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas.”).
267. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 at 558 (“The Framers intended copyright itself to
be an engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to use one's expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Tushnet, supra
note 3, at 36-37 (interpreting the Harper Court’s statement that copyright is the “engine of
free expression” to mean that copyright serves a First Amendment purpose by “preserv[ing]
creators’ incentives to put creative material in the marketplace”).
268. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115–16
(1990) (advocating fair use for a newspaper wishing to quote from a personal letter of a
political candidate).
269. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–84 (1994)
(examining the parody of a musical work).
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means to block the second speaker’s criticism from entering the marketplace.270 In
such situations, the second speaker is essential for the public to gain access to, and
thereby pass judgment on, content. Accordingly, marketplace theory would not
justify copyright’s suppression in those particular circumstances.
Consistent with this conclusion, copyright has developed a doctrine to give
priority to second speakers in such situations—the doctrine of fair use.271 The fair-use
doctrine further suggests the applicability of marketplace theory in evaluating
copyright. According to the Supreme Court, fair use represents a doctrine with
“speech-protective purposes and safeguards,” thus indicating that it is relevant to
speech interests of second speakers.272 To that end, the doctrine examines how
second speakers employ another’s original expression, and in that examination, fair
use focuses on whether the second speaker’s use furthers societal interests. If the use
furthers purposes that benefit the collective good, then the use is likely permissible.
Statutory examples of fair use include uses with a purpose of “criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research.”273 Tellingly, each of these statutory examples of fair use serves an end
that benefits the collective good of society.274 They are not focused on the individual
benefit of the user, but rather the collective benefit to society. The collective-good
focus of fair use thus supports marketplace theory of free speech, as opposed to an
individual-utility theory.
Marketplace theory is further apparent in fair use through its inquiry into whether a
second speaker’s copying transforms the original expression.275 This transformative
inquiry examines whether the copying is intended to communicate a new idea, and new
ideas are valuable only from a marketplace perspective, not from an individual-utility

270. See id. at 590–94 (holding that the fair-use doctrine would protect parodic use of a
copyrighted work).
271. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–94.
272. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2003); see also supra Part II.B.2
(discussing speech-protective function of fair use).
273. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
274. The second factor in the fair-use doctrine considers whether the original work is
creative, or alternatively, factual in nature. Id. § 107(2) (examining “the nature of the
copyrighted work”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563–64
(1985) (explaining that the second fair-use factor distinguishes between “factual works” and
“works of fiction or fantasy”); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342
F.3d 191, 200 (3d Cir. 2003) (relying on Harper’s interpretation of the second fair-use factor
to draw a distinction between creative works and factual works). This distinction between
creative works and factual works further suggests a collective-good basis for determining
fairness, for it implies that society is attempting to encourage certain types of works (creative
works) over other types (factual works).
275.
The central purpose of [the fair use] investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s
words, whether the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects” of the original
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in
other words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative.”
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579–80 (citations omitted).
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perspective.276 That is, the newness of an idea has value in the marketplace of ideas
because it introduces the possibility of additional benefit to the public; by contrast, the
newness of an idea does not suggest greater individual utility for a speaker. For that
matter, fair use simply does not consider individual utility of first or second speakers.277
Thus, the copyright system’s suppression of second-speaker speech, as well as the
fair-use doctrine as an exception to that system, imply that the marketplace-of-ideas
theory of free speech should be the standard to evaluate copyright.
2. The Argument Against Individual-Utility Theory
Unlike marketplace theory, individual-utility theory of free speech is inconsistent
with copyright’s function of suppressing second-speaker speech. As Professor
Tushnet has observed, individual-utility theory recognizes value in pure copying by
second speakers: second speakers may copy to realize the utility that comes from
participating in cultural activities, from affirming another’s belief, or from
persuading others.278 Indeed, second speakers may gain individual utility from
repeating the original expression as much as, or in some instances more than, the
original speaker.279 In view of this value that second speakers realize from repeating
expression, suppressing the second speaker appears to offend individual-utility
theory of speech.
This offense is not excused by the fact that copyright’s monopoly incentivizes the
creation of new content. Under individual-utility theory, the potential profit that
derives from the copyright monopoly is irrelevant to the inherent value of speech for
individuals. Speech is worth protecting—according to individual-utility theory—so
that speakers may realize self-fulfillment, define themselves, exercise individual
autonomy, participate in culture and democratic governance, or achieve human
dignity and self-gratification.280 The potential to financially profit is not a speech
value recognized by individual-utility theory.281 Therefore, incentivizing the creation
of speech does not justify copyright’s suppression of the second speaker, according
to principles of individual-utility theory.
Perhaps, though, it is arguable that copyright enables more instances of individual
utility than without it. Specifically, copyright may provide a first speaker the
financial means to reach her audience (and thereby realize individual utility); after
that dissemination by the first speaker, at least some of the audience may also realize

276. Id. at 579. Professor Rebecca Tushnet has provided a compelling argument for why
courts should not overemphasize the transformative nature of uses as the key component of fair
use. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 555–60 (2004). She observes First Amendment
values in copying that are based on self-autonomy theories. See id. at 538, 566–81.
277. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 276, at 587–88 (suggesting that fair use could be fixed to
accord with theories of free speech that recognize self-autonomy of speakers).
278. See id. at 538, 566–81 (defending copying “as a method of self-expression and
self-definition consistent with autonomy-based accounts of freedom of speech”).
279. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 726–27 (2003).
280. See supra note 251.
281. Cf. supra note 251.
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individual utility through licensing the speech.282 For instance, The National Review
might produce its content not to realize a profit but rather to persuade readers of its
political position. The profit that the magazine realizes through the copyright system
is necessary for the magazine to fulfill its individual end of participating in
democratic governance. Hence, the monopolistic suppression of second speakers
might find justification in its enablement of the first speaker to reach his audience,
and furthermore, in its facilitation of individual utility for second speakers who
license the speech. In this way, copyright would serve the individual-utility theory
through facilitating speech dissemination—independent of copyright’s incentivizing
authors who create for financial profit. Arguably, then, the copyright system supports
an individual-utility theory of free speech.
Although it may be true that in some instances copyright could support the
realization of speakers’ individual utility, this fact does not imply that
individual-utility theory should be relevant in evaluating speech issues in copyright
doctrine. Judicial practicalities and established copyright doctrine imply that
individual-utility theory cannot be the standard for evaluating copyright. Applying
individual-utility theory to copyright doctrine would require judges to evaluate
whether each first speaker needs the copyright monopoly to realize the financial
means for reaching her audience. Only in that situation would second-speaker
suppression be justified under individual-utility theory. Courts would need to
determine whether The National Review in fact requires the copyright monopoly to
fulfill its apparent purpose in speaking. Only in that circumstance would
individual-utility theory recognize the necessity of second-speaker suppression. And
such a judicial endeavor—assessing whether individual authors need the monopoly—
would introduce great uncertainty and subjectivity in a degree well beyond “the
metaphysics of the law.”283 Judges would be unable to determine this fact.
Nor have judges tried to determine such a fact.284 In the two-century history of
copyright, this sort of case-by-case examination of first-speaker need for copyright
monopoly has simply never occurred. It has not occurred in judicial assessment of
whether content is eligible for copyright protection. It has not occurred in fair use,
which, as discussed above, examines whether second-speaker expression will further
collectively valued categories of speech.285 Copyright has not applied an inquiry into
whether a particular author requires the copyright monopoly to disseminate her
speech—with respect to both the term of the copyright and the particular rights.
Therefore, any benefit that copyright provides to speakers’ individual utility appears
incidental to, rather than a justification for, the copyright system’s suppression of
second speakers.
The conclusion of this discussion is that copyright makes sense only from a
collective-good theory of free speech, and in particular, the marketplace-of-ideas

282. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 37 (“[C]opyright aids free speech because effective
dissemination of creative work costs money.” (internal quotation omitted)).
283. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
284. This is, of course, a descriptive argument that marketplace theory best describes the
doctrine and practice of copyright law. It is an entirely different question as to whether
copyright law should change to better accommodate individual-utility theory of free speech.
See generally Tushnet, supra note 276, at 587–88.
285. See supra Part II.B.2.
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theory—not an individual-utility theory. As a system of suppressing second speakers
to incentivize the creation and dissemination of original speech, copyright furthers
collective goods that follow from original speech. It does not further individual utility
of second speakers. Although copyright serves the individual utility of speakers who
need financial means to reach their audiences, that fact alone does not justify
copyright’s general suppression of second speakers. The function of copyright,
therefore, points to marketplace theory. And just as marketplace theory must be the
theory for evaluating content-based suppression of second speakers, marketplace
theory must be the speech theory for evaluating content-based suppression of first
speakers. Specifically, marketplace theory must analyze the suppression of speech
that could result from Congress refusing to extend copyright to first speakers. That
analysis follows.
B. Copyright’s Correction of Marketplace Failures
Does content-based copyright denial support the marketplace theory of free
speech? The answer requires a fundamental understanding of how copyright
functions within the marketplace of ideas. In essence, copyright represents a system
for taxing and subsidizing the proliferation of ideas. Copyright taxes the repetition
of copied speech in order to subsidize the creation and dissemination of original
speech. That is, the government taxes the free flow of information when it imposes
the cost of the copyright monopoly on recipients of content. At the same time, the
government subsidizes the creation of content when it transfers the benefit of the
copyright monopoly to content creators. Copyright therefore functions to further
some speech (original speech) at the expense of other speech (copied speech).
Copyright’s tax-and-subsidy system of speech is consistent with a laissez-faire
model of the marketplace of ideas. The strength of the marketplace of ideas is its
process for deriving truth—a democratic process without government
interference.286 Yet, as discussed above, copyright’s tax-and-subsidy speech system
is justified within the marketplace of ideas because that system apparently gives rise
to an increase in the output and dissemination of ideas.287 The marketplace apparently
works better with copyright than without it. The corollary of this justification, then,
is that market forces are by themselves insufficient to produce the maximum and best
output of ideas. In the absence of copyright’s tax-and-subsidy system, a laissez-faire
marketplace of ideas falls short of fostering an environment wherein the most truth
may prevail—at least this appears to be an assumption of the Speech Clause (under
marketplace theory) when read in conjunction with the Copyright Clause.288 Stated
another way, to the extent that the Speech Clause exists to foster a process wherein
truth may prevail, that Clause fails to provide ample incentive for speakers to create
original expression. The Copyright Clause provides that incentive.289

286. See SMOLLA, supra note 249, § 2:20.
287. See supra Part III.A.1 (examining justification for second-speaker speech suppression
under marketplace-of-ideas theory of free speech).
288. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I (the Speech Clause), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8 (the Copyright Clause).
289. Tellingly, the focus of the Copyright Clause—promoting the progress of science—furthers
the ultimate end of the marketplace theory—truth proliferation. See Snow, supra note 118, at 265.
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Thus, a constitutional implication of the Copyright Clause is that the marketplace
of ideas falls short of fully achieving its purpose. This insight is important because
copyright appears to alleviate another problem of the marketplace. That other
problem is simple: the marketplace exists to promote the collective good of
society,290 yet it relies on value judgments of individuals who place greatest value on
their own individual interests.291 The end of the marketplace reflects a collective
value, whereas the means to achieve that end reflects individual values.292 This
distinction in valuations is critical, ultimately causing market failures.293 Imperfect
information, negative externalities, and transaction costs arise in the marketplace of
ideas, inhibiting its efficient or proper functioning.294 More specifically, an
individual’s inaccuracies in assessing content value for the collective and an
individual’s inability to control the structure of copyright monopolies hinder the end
of the marketplace.295 Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2 below discuss these problems of
the marketplace of ideas and how Congress may alleviate them through enacting a
content-based copyright regime.
1. Accuracy
Perhaps most problematic about the pure laissez-faire model of the marketplace
theory is the fact that it yields great inaccuracy through its method of content
assessment. Individual values that inform content-purchasing decisions do not
always represent collective values.296 Individual values often do not align with
collective values of content that should be promoted.297 A simple example illustrates
this point: collectively, the public may desire to further scientific research over
defamatory falsehoods; yet individually, more members of the public prefer
defamatory tabloids over scientific papers. The same could be said of the difference
between individual and collective valuations of gun safety material and graphically

290. See supra Part III.A; supra note 256.
291. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
292. See id.
293. Cf. Baker, supra note 251, at 965 & n.5 (“Just as real world conditions prevent the
laissez-faire economic market—praised as a social means to facilitate optimal allocation and
production of goods—from achieving the socially desired results, critics of the classic
marketplace of ideas theory point to factors that prevent it from successfully facilitating the
discovery of truth or generating proper social perspectives and decisions.”); Stanley Ingber,
The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 5, 15–17 (1984)
(describing the laissez-faire economic model that free-speech theory follows and criticizing
that model for employing faulty assumptions); Tushnet, supra note 3, at 44 (observing that
speech regulation can improve the functioning of the speech market).
294. See generally Brett M. Frischmann, Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment,
2008 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 301, 310–21 (2008) (exploring the externalities of speech and
recognizing the need for government to aid speakers in internalizing externalities).
295. See TRIBE, supra note 250, § 12-1, at 786 (“Especially when the wealthy have more
access to the most potent media of communication than the poor, how sure can we be that ‘free
trade in ideas’ is likely to generate truth?”).
296. See id.
297. See Mark H. Moore, Introduction to the Harvard Law Review Symposium: Public
Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (2003).
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violent video games: collectively society may prefer the former, but individually
more members prefer the latter. Simply put, individual valuations of content often
fail to account for collective goals of society. As a result, by relying on individual
choices to achieve a collective end, marketplace theory introduces a significant
likelihood that its purpose will fail—the purpose being a forum that represents the
best test for truth. The focus of individual choices does not align with the focus of
the collective public good.
Related to this problem of inaccurate assessments of the collective value of
content is the problem of third-party externalities.298 Individual perspectives fail to
account for harmful externalities to the collective.299 For instance, commentators
argue that some violent video games may cause aggressive behavior, possibly
leading to serious social harms in extreme cases.300 Even if this is true, this fact likely
does not make a difference to authors of those games, who presumably do not
consider harmful externalities in deciding which content to create. As with any
market, the marketplace of ideas is not immune from decision makers failing to
internalize the social costs of individual decisions.301
A final criticism related to the inaccuracy of individual content assessment is that
individual consumers of content may lack sufficient information to determine content
value. On the assumption that some content may lead to harmful effects for the
individual who consumes it, individual consumers may lack this knowledge. For
instance, suppose that certain pornographic content leads some of its consumers to
engage in behavior that destroys family relationships, or to engage in sexual
predatory behavior.302 The likelihood that these events would actually happen would
seem relevant for individual consumers of pornographic content. Yet that
information is not likely to be known by those consumers. Individuals lack resources
to gather and assess data relating to the value of content in their particular situation.
Simply put, individual assessment of content is often based on imperfect information.

298. Frischmann, supra note 294, at 310–21.
299. Id.
300. See, e.g., Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Violent Video Games and Hostile
Expectations: A Test of the General Aggression Model, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1679, 1684 (2002) (“[T]he present study supports the General Aggression Model–based
prediction that exposure to violent media can influence the amount of aggressive expectations
that people conjure up in response to potential conflict situations.”); Youssef Hasan, Laurent
Bègue, Michael Scharkow & Brad J. Bushman, The More You Play, the More Aggressive You
Become: A Long-Term Experimental Study of Cumulative Violent Video Game Effects on
Hostile Expectations and Aggressive Behavior, 49 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 224, 224–
27 (2013) (testing cumulative effect of violent video games and concluding that “aggressive
behavior and hostile expectations increased over days for violent game players, but not for
nonviolent video game players”). But see A. SCOTT CUNNINGHAM, BENJAMIN ENGELSTÄTTER
& MICHAEL R. WARD, UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES ON VIOLENT
CRIME 1, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1804959 (“[A] one percent increase in violent
games is associated with up to a 0.03% decrease in violent crime.”).
301. Cf. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968)
(“Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”).
302. See Robert P. George, The Concept of Public Morality, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 17, 17–18
(2000) (arguing that pornography causes “moral harm”).
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A pure laissez-faire model of the marketplace theory may therefore lead to problems
of inaccuracy in the theory’s attempt to assess the collective value of content.
These problems of inaccuracy stem from individuals assessing content value.
Applied correctly, a collective institution, with its collective perspective and
resources, can reduce the likelihood of these inaccuracies. Congress represents that
collective institution. As the constitutional means for collective action by members
of the public, Congress brings a collective perspective for realizing value. By
constitutional design, Congress values expression according to its value for the
collective—not the individual. Congress recognizes the greater social value of
scientific research papers over defamatory tabloids. Similarly, Congress’s collective
perspective considers societal effects of content that the individual view may not
even consider. Congress might identify harmful effects of violent video games on
innocent third parties, where individual players might not. Finally, Congress has
more resources than individual consumers to identify information relevant to its
social value—from both a societal and an individual perspective.303 For instance,
Congress has means to determine the likelihood of harm to consumers of pornography,
as well as to innocent third parties, whereas consumers themselves may not. Therefore,
by allowing Congress to determine which content should receive copyright, Congress
can exercise the perspective and expend the resources necessary to ensure the most
accurate assessment of content most likely to achieve a collective end.
2. Efficiency
The pure laissez-faire model of free speech is inefficient in its means for
incentivizing the creation of new ideas into the marketplace. Under laissez-faire
principles of a market, all content creators should receive the same reward for
speaking.304 Only if all content receives the same property rights would it seem that
government is not favoring certain content.305 All content, then, would need to
receive the same copyright term, the same specific rights, and the same remedies for
infringement.306
This implication suggests an inefficient suppression of second-speaker speech.307
Not all content requires the same grant of property rights to effect an incentive for its

303. For instance, the additional resources of Congress justify its imposition of automobile
safety measures, where consumers apparently are unable to identify attendant harms. See 15
U.S.C. § 1381 (repealed 1994) (“[T]he purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents
and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents.”); Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the
Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1175 (1988) (describing Congress’s
automobile safety legislation) (“[A]ll consumers were not necessarily free to choose safe or
safer cars, nor were they adequately informed to make a correct choice. Congress thus rejected
arguments that the market alone would provide the level of automobile safety that Congress
now sought to ensure.”).
304. See generally John H. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Constitutional Law, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1756, 1762–65 (1981) (explaining laissez-faire principles).
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining second-speaker speech suppression).
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creation and dissemination.308 Stated differently, in order to provide sufficient
incentive for original authors to speak content, copyright law need not suppress
certain second-speaker expression for as long a duration as copyright law must
suppress other expression.309 For instance, the copyright term for computer programs
may not need to be as long as the term for full-feature films: perhaps computer
programmers would create the same programs if the copyright term were five years
instead of the current life-plus-seventy years.310 This possibility suggests an
unnecessary suppression of second speakers, who serve to further disseminate ideas
for public evaluation.311 Thus, the uniform set of property rights granted to all content
suggests that some second speakers must remain silent longer than necessary to
incentivize content creation.
In selecting the copyright term and scope of rights, Congress must balance the
public’s interest in incentivizing original content against the public’s interest in
gaining access to (and shaping opinion about) content. Unavoidably, that balance
will vary according to general categories of content. For instance, the monopoly term
necessary to incentivize news broadcasts, which consumers usually watch for only
the first showing, may be considerably shorter than the monopoly term necessary to
incentivize historical fiction, which consumers may watch repeatedly. Similarly, the
public interest in gaining access to news broadcasts may be greater than its interest
in gaining access to historical fiction.312 Efficiency in the marketplace suggests, then,
that the suppression of second-speaker speech should be tailored according to
content. By tailoring copyright’s speech suppression according to content, the
marketplace can reduce wasteful suppression.

308. See Jessica Litman, The Economics of Open Access Law Publishing, 10 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 779, 782 (2006) (“The role of copyright in the dissemination of scholarly
research is in many ways curious, since neither authors nor the entities that compensate them
for their authorship are motivated by the incentives supplied by the copyright system.”).
309. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 46, at 929–30 (noting reasons other than legal
monopolies which may spur the creation of intellectual-property goods, and observing that
optimal level of copyright protection is often industry specific); see also Eric E. Johnson,
Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012)
(questioning copyright’s assumption that external incentives are necessary); Rebecca Tushnet,
Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513,
515 (2009) (“[T]he desire to create can be excessive, beyond rationality, and free from the
need for economic incentive. . . . [A] copyright law that treats creativity as a product of
economic incentives can miss the mark and harm what it aims to promote.”).
310. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
311. If copyright limits such second-speaker dissemination only to individuals with
financial means to obtain a license, the law would favor the judgment of those with financial
means over those without that means. Simply put, copyright would favor the wealthy over the
poor, ultimately affecting the public’s assessment of content. Marketplace theory, therefore,
values second-speaker dissemination—even if not as much as it values first-speaker creation
and dissemination.
312. Compare Nash v. CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that
historical fiction receives weaker copyright protection than other categories of content), with
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (recognizing
public interest in accessibility of the Kennedy shooting film).
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Determining copyright rights and terms according to content enables efficient
structuring of copyright’s speech suppression. Such discrimination allows Congress
to identify content that requires longer terms and stronger rights to incentivize
original creation and dissemination, as well as content that requires greater
second-speaker dissemination. Congress might specify that certain content should
have longer or shorter terms, be more or less likely to be subject to fair uses, be
subject to specific monopoly price controls, and be denied or granted particular
rights. Indeed, Congress has already exercised such discrimination in specifying that
works that are more creative are less likely to be subject to fair use,313 that
nondramatic-musical works are subject to a compulsory licensing scheme,314 that
sound recordings lack a right of public performance,315 and that certain visual arts
have moral rights.316 Consistent with its current practice, then, Congress should be
able to structure incentives according to content by engaging in content-based
copyright denial.
IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE
Although defining copyright eligibility according to content may facilitate
accuracy and efficiency in the marketplace of ideas, the mere possibility of these
benefits does not imply their actuality. Individual members of Congress do not
always act for the collective good.317 They are subject to motives relating to power
and wealth, which may color a member’s decision about whether content yields a
collective good.318 Suppose, for instance, that a filmmaker contributes large sums of
money to congressional campaigns, and as a result, is able to persuade members of
Congress to extend the copyright term for films—or for that matter, to extend the
term for that filmmaker only.319 Congress’s ability to be accurate in its judgment is
of no worth if its members’ motives cannot be trusted to act for the collective good.
Indeed, the very benefit of having a marketplace theory of free speech is that
individual members of the public are more trustworthy than collective governing
bodies.320 The judgments that members of the public make about content reflect their

313. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012); supra note 274.
314. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
315. Id. § 106(4), (6).
316. See id. § 106A; Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 264
(2009) (“[M]oral rights have been part of U.S. federal law since the enactment of the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 (‘VARA’), an amendment to the Copyright Act.”).
317. See Frank Newport, Americans: My Member OK, Most in Congress Are Not, GALLUP
(Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/178487/americans-member-congress-not.aspx.
318. Professor Jessica Litman has convincingly mapped the history and practice of content
industries capturing Congress’s copyright power. See JESSICA D. LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT
31–32 (2001); Jessica Litman, The Politics of Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 313, 314–16 (2009); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 878–79 (1987).
319. See Timothy B. Lee, 15 Years Ago, Congress Kept Mickey Mouse Out of the Public
Domain. Will They Do It Again?, The Switch, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/25/15-years-ago-congress-kept-mickey
-mouse-out-of-the-public-domain-will-they-do-it-again.
320. See SMOLLA, supra note 249, § 2:20.
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beliefs about the merits of that content—not a promise for campaign financing. The
same cannot be said for members of Congress.321
In addition to this problem of untrustworthy motives, there is no reason to believe
that members of Congress are not subject to the same inaccuracies of judgment that
befall members of the public. Members of Congress might allow incorrect political,
religious, or ideological views to influence their opinions about which expression
will benefit or harm the collective good—or even what the collective good is. A
majority of Congress, for instance, may believe that material which endorses, or
alternatively criticizes, principles of the Tea Party is detrimental to the collective
good of society. That majority view, however, may not be correct. So just as
imperfect information may influence individuals in the marketplace, so also may
imperfect information influence members of Congress—at the expense of a minority
view that is correct.
These possibilities suggest that Congress’s power to practice content
discrimination in defining copyright eligibility should not be absolute. Limits must
exist. Part IV.A through Part IV.D below consider both legal and practical limits on
the reach of Congress’s power to influence speech through denying copyright to
specific content.
A. Viewpoint Discrimination
Perhaps the strongest check against members of Congress employing copyright
to further personal agendas and inaccurate beliefs lies in a core principle of free
speech: that government may not discriminate based on a speaker’s viewpoint.322
Marketplace theory places the greatest value on protecting specific viewpoints.323
Protecting viewpoints from government interference protects the marketplace’s
process for merit-based competition among specific ideas.324 The process is
paramount, representing a democratic ideal for determining the legitimacy of ideas.
The principle of viewpoint neutrality therefore guards against government picking
sides in, and thereby influencing, the democratic process for judging ideas.325 So
even if circumstances justify government deciding the topic of debate, government
may never pick sides in that debate. Above all else, marketplace theory preserves
judgment of viewpoints for the public.
Free speech theory would thus prevent Congress from practicing viewpoint
discrimination in defining copyright eligibility. Congress could deny copyright only

321. See Newport, supra note 317.
322. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (“When the basis for the
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is
proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists.”).
323. See id. at 388–94.
324. See City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429
U.S. 167, 175–76 (1976) (“To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a
monopoly in expressing its views . . . is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees.”).
325. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785–86 (1978) (“Especially
where . . . the legislature’s suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a
debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First
Amendment is plainly offended.” (footnote omitted)).
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for general categories of content—not particular viewpoints.326 This would guard
against members of Congress employing the copyright power to realize personal or
political gain rather than the collective good. It would mean that Congress could not
deny copyright to content that specifically condones, or condemns, principles of the
Tea Party, as contemplated in the above example. Similarly, Congress could not
extend the copyright term for a particular speaker. Congress’s content discrimination
must be viewpoint neutral.
B. Rational Basis
An additional constitutional check against congressional abuse of the copyright
power arises in the rational-basis restraint that applies to all congressional powers.327 In
another work, I argue that Congress’s power to extend copyright according to content
stems from the Copyright Clause’s grant that Congress may exercise its copyright power
“To promote the Progress of Science.”328 Like any other grant, Congress’s
discriminatory denial of content would be subject to a review of whether the denial
rationally relates to promoting the progress of science.329 In the context of content-based
copyright denial, this would mean that Congress could not deny copyright to specific
categories of content that necessarily promote progress in science.330
Whether a specific category of content necessarily promotes progress in science
is based on both the meaning of Progress of Science as well as society’s common
understanding of that category of content.331 Progress of Science suggests
advancements in knowledge and learning.332 So if society has a common
understanding that a specific category of content promotes advancements in
knowledge and learning, Congress may not deny copyright for that category of
content. To deny it a copyright would fail a rational-basis review of Congress’s
exercise of the copyright power.333 For instance, Congress could not deny copyright
to a broad category of content designated as “all content relating to the hard
sciences”: the common understanding of the hard sciences is that that category of

326. For instance, if Congress were to deny copyright for pornographic works, it could not
do so in a way that discriminated with respect to a particular viewpoint about women. See
American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.)
(holding viewpoint discriminatory a criterion that punished expression that portrayed women
“as submissive in matters sexual or as enjoying humiliation”). Instead, Congress could choose
a viewpoint-neutral criterion such as expression that is indecent, that is pornographic, or that
has visual depictions that are harmful to minors. See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539
U.S. 194, 201, 210–11 (2003) (plurality opinion) (upholding condition that Congress placed
on funding for libraries, where condition restricted libraries from allowing pornographic
images based on, inter alia, criterion of “‘visual depictions’ that are ‘harmful to minors’”
(quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 9134(f)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(i))).
327. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938)
(articulating rational-basis review standard for congressional acts).
328. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Snow, supra note 9, at 5–42.
329. Snow, supra note 9, at 19–22.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 18–22.
332. See id. at 9–22.
333. Id. at 19–22.
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content unquestionably promotes advancements in knowledge and learning.334
Similarly, society generally considers musical compositions and musical
performances as content effecting beneficial knowledge.335 The same could be said
of political and religious categories of content, which enjoy core speech protection
because of their value to society.336 As evidenced by free-speech jurisprudence,
society views the categories of political and religious content as necessarily
advancing knowledge.337 On the other hand, such a common understanding does not
exist for pornography, violent video games, or most other specific categories of
entertainment.338 Thus, rational-basis review of Congress’s power to discriminate in
promoting the progress of science bars Congress from denying copyright to specific
categories of content that society commonly deems as advancing knowledge or
providing social benefit.339

334. Id. at 19–21.
335. Id. at 21.
336. See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I (barring Congress from making a law that prohibits the
free exercise of religion); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995)
(“Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment
affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order to assure the unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.” (internal quotations omitted)).
337. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“[P]olitical speech must
prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence. Laws that
burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny . . . .” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995)
(“Our precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment
orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression.
Indeed, in Anglo–American history, at least, government suppression of speech has so
commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without
religion would be Hamlet without the prince. Accordingly, we have not excluded from
free-speech protections religious proselytizing, or even acts of worship.” (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted)).
338. See Snow, supra note 9, at 21–22. This judgment about content for particular
categories of content would be akin to the judgment that courts must make in determining
whether a trademark is immoral or scandalous. In commenting about that judgment, the
Federal Circuit has noted:
In order to prove that [a particular trademark] is scandalous, the [government]
must demonstrate that the mark is shocking to the sense of truth, decency, or
propriety; disgraceful; offensive; disreputable; . . . giving offense to the
conscience or moral feelings; [or] calling out for condemnation. . . . Furthermore,
whether the mark [in question], including innuendo, comprises scandalous matter
is to be ascertained (1) from the standpoint of not necessarily a majority, but a
substantial composite of the general public, and (2) in the context of
contemporary attitudes.
In re Mavety Media Grp. Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
339. This conclusion does not mean, however, that Congress could not deny copyright for
any content with such a common understanding. It means only that Congress may not specify
such content as ineligible for copyright. For example, if Congress specified pornography as
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C. Practical Effects of Abuse
These two limits on Congress’s copyright power—viewpoint neutrality and
rational basis—leave much content subject to discrimination, and so these limits do
not prevent the potential for congressional abuse. Suppose, for instance, that
Congress were to withhold copyright for late-night comedy shows, owing to
criticisms that such shows were directing towards the majority political party. On its
face, such a denial would reflect neither viewpoint discrimination nor an irrational
exercise of its power to promote progress in science. Specifically, the criterion of
late-night comedy shows does not indicate that Congress is acting against a particular
viewpoint, even if most late-night shows happen to criticize particular political
viewpoints. Further, societal values do not indicate a common understanding that
late-night comedies necessarily promote advancements in knowledge and learning.
Nevertheless, if Congress were to deny copyright for the comedy shows because of
their political criticisms, the denial would reflect congressional motives that do not
further the marketplace of ideas. The question to consider is thus: should the
possibility of congressional abuse preclude content-based copyright?
This possibility should not preclude content-based copyright. As an initial matter,
it is worth noting that viewpoint-based denials that employ seemingly
viewpoint-neutral criteria, such as in the hypothetical example above, represent a
relatively limited class—only those situations where an entire category of content is
expressing a single view (for example, the entire class of late-night comedy shows
express a single view, that is, criticism of the majority political party). My argument
should not be interpreted as a justification for viewpoint-based copyright denial.
Rather, I am arguing that the limited instances where viewpoint-based denial does
occur—for an ostensibly content-based reason—should not justify altogether
stripping Congress of its discretion to deny copyright. And here is why: copyright
denial does not prevent speech from occurring. The influence of copyright denial is
relatively limited. Speech suppression by copyright denial does not result from the
threat of a criminal or civil penalty; if suppression does occur, it is from the threat of
depriving a particular means of financial revenue. Specifically, the effect of
withholding copyright is simply denying profit that derives from a
government-enforced monopoly—not withholding any and all profit.340 Copyright
represents only one means of realizing profit. Internet technologies, for instance,
provide other means for realizing profits: they enable architectural rights of
exclusion.341 Or simply selling the first copy, without any right of exclusion, yields
an opportunity for profit—albeit not as much as an extended monopoly.342

ineligible for copyright, an author of pornography could not circumvent this denial by inserting
a political statement within the pornographic material. The presence of the political statement
would not imply that Congress’s choice to deny copyright to pornographic material would be
irrational. Hence, the common understanding that certain content advances knowledge does
not imply that that content necessarily must receive a copyright; it implies only that Congress
may not designate that content specifically as ineligible for copyright.
340. See supra Part I.A.
341. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501, 514–15 (1999).
342. See Landes & Posner, supra note 6, at 332.
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So even if Congress were to deny copyright for late-night comedy shows because
of a viewpoint-based motive, the shows could still exist. Perhaps they would be
funded through pay-per-view streaming technologies, or perhaps funded by
advertisers who valued its initial showing.343 Copyright denial might affect content
production, but it would not altogether deny the opportunity for that production. Even
without copyright, financial means for speaking still exist, so content can still be
voiced and heard. In short, denying speakers a copyright subsidy does not deny
speakers the right to enter the marketplace of ideas. The potential for congressional
abuse does not imply a risk of heightened speech consequences. Hence, both the
potential for abuse and the potential for silencing speakers as a result of that abuse
are limited.
D. Congress as an Untrustworthy Actor
Despite the potential benefits of content-based copyright denial,344 the
constitutional restraints against abuses of power,345 and the practical limitations on
copyright influencing speech,346 there is still reason to prefer content neutrality.
Congress has a history of acting more for political gain than for the collective
good.347 Indeed, in the area of copyright specifically, there is reason to believe that
Congress has ceded its lawmaking authority to industry.348 Against this history, the
argument to trust Congress seems weak. The benefit of content-based copyright
denial consists of a mere possibility: Congress might exercise its discretion to benefit
the collective good. So Congress might act for the collective, but its history suggests
that it will not.349 Even with viewpoint-neutral and rational-basis restraints, much
discretion would be left open to Congress.350 And a bare possibility that Congress
could exercise that discretion to benefit the collective seems unpersuasive as a reason
to allow the discretion in the first place.
The argument that Congress has exercised similar discretion in other matters also
seems unpersuasive as a justification for content-based copyright denial. Speech is
unlike any other public resource.351 He who controls the content of speech controls
the power of the idea. Control of speech represents control of thought. So although

343. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805,
1831–32 (1995).
344. See supra Part III.B.
345. See supra Part IV.A–B.
346. See supra Part IV.C.
347. See FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)
(“Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect
of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of
corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.”).
348. See LITMAN, supra note 318, at 31 (“In 1998, copyright lobbyists persuaded Congress
to enact a twenty-six-thousand-word, fifty-page coda to the copyright statute . . . .”).
349. See FEC, 470 U.S. at 497; Newport, supra note 317.
350. See supra Part IV.C.
351. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–327 (1937) (describing the “freedom of
thought, and speech . . . [as] the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form
of freedom”).
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some circumstances exist where Congress has discretion that may affect speech,
those circumstances are not the same as choosing among which ideas to promote for
public consumption. Hence, even if Congress’s discrimination is only with respect
to general categories of speech, and even if there are other alternatives to speak
without copyright, these facts alone do not seem to justify even a limited degree of
control over speech in the marketplace of ideas. The choice of which ideas to promote
seems appropriate only for speakers—not Congress.
Why, then, should we trust Congress with a power to discriminate among content
in the marketplace of ideas? To surrender this most valuable right to a government
institution that has repeatedly proven itself untrustworthy, there must be a problem
worth fixing. There must be a problem that amounts to more than inefficiencies and
inaccuracies. In short, there must be a problem with content that is so bad that even
Congress would act in the best interest of the collective to fix it, and furthermore, the
benefit of fixing that problem must outweigh the costs of misusing the power. There
must be a problem that justifies the seemingly extreme remedy of government
influence over ideas.
Admittedly, this argument is powerful. The history and incentives of Congress
should always give pause in ceding Congress greater authority, especially in the
context of speech. Yet a very real problem justifies the risk involved. Serious social
harms follow from certain content. Consider pornography, violent video games,352
hate speech,353 and crime-facilitating speech:354 some scholars argue that the harms
that these expressions cause are so serious that they should not receive free-speech
protection. For instance, some have argued that pornography harms the social
institutions of marriage and family;355 harms women both generally and specifically
(in the production process);356 provokes bad norms; and damages children’s moral
development.357 If accurate, these effects would be highly destructive for the social
infrastructure of society. Although I do not attempt to prove the actuality of these
harms, I observe others who forcefully argue that socially destructive harms derive
from categories of speech such as those listed above.358 Furthermore, although I refer
to Congress’s power to deny copyright, I do not argue that denying copyright would
necessarily reduce content proliferation for every specific category of content. More
study is required to formulate a conclusion on whether copyright denial would effect a
desired outcome for specific content.359 Here, I argue only that Congress should be able

352. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 2761–71 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
353. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Targeted Hate Speech and the First Amendment:
How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided Snyder, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 45 (2013).
354. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (2005).
355. See George, supra note 302, at 17–18.
356. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, Objectification, in SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 213, 213–14
(1999); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1985).
357. See Andrew Koppelman, Essay, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 1635, 1647–72 (2005).
358. See supra notes 351–56 and accompanying text.
359. See Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 46, at 929–30 (noting reasons other than legal
monopolies which may spur the creation of intellectual-property goods, and observing that
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to examine the issue. I argue that the apparent harms from some content justify a
collective examination of whether copyright denial is appropriate to reduce production.
Despite the alleged harms, the law has been reluctant to control, much less
examine, such content. Unless the harm is verifiable and immediate, the law is loath
to censor.360 If the harms cannot be proven, if the harms cannot be shown to
consistently arise as a consequence of the content, or if the harms do not pose
immediate danger, the harms do not justify government silencing an idea.361 But in
the meantime, the harms may continue. Outside the ambit of unprotected speech, it
would seem that the harmful content cannot be controlled. A majority cannot stop
the minority from speaking socially destructive content, despite its apparent threat to
the collective well-being and proper functioning of civil society. What is to be done?
Copyright is the compromise. Content-based copyright denial represents the
middle ground between banning content whose harmful effects are unverifiable,
inconsistent, or nonimmediate and protecting content whose harmful effects may
destroy the social fabric of society. Copyright allows the majority of citizens to
exercise influence over content in a way that does not rise to the level of coercion
present in other means of content control.362 In short, harms that threaten to
undermine civil society justify the limited risk of trusting Congress to exercise its
copyright power based on content.
Thus, problems that pose significant harms to society at large justify
content-based copyright denial. Although Congress is not a trustworthy actor for
extending privileges of speech, Congress is the only actor to deal with those
problems. And copyright is the best compromise.
CONCLUSION
Content-based copyright denial does not offend the Speech Clause—from either
a doctrinal, theoretical, or practical standpoint. Doctrinally, content-based copyright
denial fits within jurisprudence dealing with content-based restrictions in the
contexts of limited-public forums and in spending subsidies.363 Copyright represents
a limited-public forum because copyright exists to facilitate private speech of a certain
sort—that which promotes the progress of science.364 Copyright also represents a
subsidy of property rights that is analogous to a monetary subsidy under Congress’s
spending power.365 Under these doctrines, Congress may deny copyright based on
content insofar as Congress specifies a viewpoint-neutral category of content, and
insofar as that category reasonably relates to promoting the progress of science.366

optimal level of copyright protection is often industry specific).
360. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 249, §§ 4:18–19.
361. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam) (requiring
speech to incite imminent lawless action to be unprotected by First Amendment); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (describing speech that is not protected by
the First Amendment).
362. See supra Part I.B.
363. See supra Part II.A.
364. See supra Part II.A.1.
365. See supra Part II.A.2.
366. See supra Part II.A.
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Theoretically, content-based copyright denial furthers the purpose of the
marketplace-of-ideas speech theory. The power to deny copyright based on content
enables Congress to correct failures in the marketplace that arise from individuals
defining values of the collective.367 The power further enables Congress to structure
copyright so that public access to ideas may be realized as soon as possible, avoiding
wasteful speech suppression.368
Practically, content-based copyright denial is workable. The power would be
checked by the restraints of viewpoint neutrality and rational basis.369 Moreover,
even if Congress were to deny copyright to speech that should not be discouraged,
the speech could still be had.370 As a content subsidy, copyright represents a soft
means for influencing content. And that means is a practical necessity in view of
subtle but destructive harms that threaten civil society.371 Copyright, then, represents
a compromise between censorship and apathy—a means for dealing with speech that
poses significant yet unprovable costs.
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